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ABSTRACT
Philosophical Foundations of Chinese Political Ethics
(August 1973)
'^h^"*-^ong PflUj B, A*
,
National Taiwan University
M„ A.
,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Felix E. Oppenheim
This study attempts a systematic philosophical analysis
of various metaethical theories advanced by prominent Chinese
political philosophers in answer to the question whether it
is possible to demonstrate that certain basic principles of
political ethics are objectively either true or false, inde-
pendently of subjective moral commitments, and if so, by
what method. Like their counterparts in the West, Chinese
political philosophers have given various, and often con-
flicting, answers to this question.
The principal objective of this study is, not to make
an original contribution to metaethics, nor to give a his-
torical account of the development of these political phi-
losophies, but to provide an analytical interpretation and
vii
a critical understanding of different Chinese political phi-
losophies which are often grouped under Confucianism, Neo-
Confucianism, Moism, Taoism, Legalism, Socialism, and Corn-
muni sm 0 Various answers to the question are illustrated by
the works representing these schools of thought. But they
are organized, not historically, but systematically.
I have tried to give an accurate presentation of these
various political philosophies, but X have not confined my-
self to the presentation of a summary of these philosophies.
I am convinced that only one of these conflicting views is
correct, and I have stated my criticisms of all others, in
the belief that they will perhaps serve to stimulate further
discussions among the students of Chinese political philoso-
phy and thereby indirectly help to increase our understanding
of this crucial problem.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
A# Statement of the Problem
Is it possible to demonstrate that certain basic prin-
ciples of political ethics are objectively either true or
false, independently of subjective moral commitments, and
if so, by what method? Or are they expressions of the speak-
er s subjective moral attitude, preference or commitment
which cannot be either true or false? These are enduring
questions in the metaethics of politics which many Chinese
no less than Western political philosophers have attempted
to answer, explicitly or implicitly. They are questions, not
of normative ethics, but of metaethics of politics or philos-
ophy of political ethics because they deal with moral prin-
ciples of politics, not directly, but as an object of phil-
osophical analysis. HMeta-ethics does not propound any moral
principles or goals for action, except possibly by implica-
tion; it consists entirely of philosophical analysis.
In spite of their importance in philosophical inquiries
and in spite of the impressive strides made by analytic phi-
2losophy in the last several decades, there is no systematic
analysis of the answers provided by major Chinese political
thinkers, either in English or in Chinese. Among the grow-
ing literature on Chinese philosophy, there are two books
by prominent twentieth century Chinese philosophers whose
titles suggest that they may cover the subject. But neither
does. One of them. The Development of the Logical Method in
Ancient China by Hu Shih has little to say about the above
problem
.
2 The other. Intellectual Intuition and Chinese
Philosophy (in Chinese) by Mou Tsung-san deals almost exclu-
sively with the metaphysics of Immanuel Kant and some Chinese
philosophers, though the author promises in his preface to
open a new frontier in metaethics o Even in a monumental
work like the eight-volume Encyclopedia of Philosophy , which
deals with the philosophies of more than fifteen Chinese
philosophers, one cannot find a careful analysis of the com-
peting theories advanced by some of them in answer to these
questions. The absence of such an analysis in the Encyclo-
pedia which examines in detail the metaethical problems of
Western philosophers is perhaps not an oversight of its edi-
tor or an accidental omission on the part of its contributors.
3It seems to be a reflection of the lack of interest of
scholars in Chinese philosophy and the state of scholarship
in this particular area. I therefore propose to attempt,
for the first time as far as I can ascertain from my re-
search, a systematic analysis of the answers advanced by
various Chinese political thinkers.
B. The Nature of the Proposed Analysis
The theories which I shall examine do not belong to
normative ethics, for they do not advocate specific moral
principles of politics. These theories deal with the cog-
nitive status of these normative principles, that is, whether
and how these normative principles of politics can be shown
to be objectively true or false. They therefore belong to
metaethics of politics in general and to epistemology of
political ethics in particular.
In their attempt to answer this epistemological ques-
tion, many moral philosophers have found it necessary to
deal, explicitly or implicitly, with one or more of the fol-
lowing problems in metaethics i (1) The meaning of value
4terms such as 'good' and 'evil' and of moral terms such as
right and 'wrong'. Do they stand for some "natural" or
nonnatural properties? Or do they function to express the
speaker s moral attitude toward, or his commendation or con-
demnation of, a certain kind of action or state of affairs?
(2) The nature and function of ethical statements in which
these and similar ethical terms occur. Are moral statements
a subclass of factual statements? Or do they perform a func-
tion drastically different from factual statements? (3) The
criteria of validity of ethical judgments. Can ethical judg-
ments be justified in any objective way similar to those in
which factual judgments can be justified? If not, can they
be shown to be valid by some other methods? The answers each
philosopher gives to these questions will determine into which
of the metaethical schools he should be classified.
Co Some Difficulties
This proposed attempt will not be an easy one. First
of all, being the first attempt in the area of Chinese polit
ical philosophy, I am forced, in a sense, to wander in the
5dark with little, if any, guiding light. There is no exist-
ing work on Chinese political philosophy which may serve as
a guide to this study. Secondly, to find out the answers
given by Chinese thinkers, it is necessary to read the un-
indexed, and often voluminous, collections of original works.
these works in most cases fail to separate empirical,
ethical, metaethical, and metaphysical arguments. Since most
of their answers were not set forth in methodical philosophi-
cal treatises and their metaethical views were often far from
unequivocal, one of the main tasks of this study is the inter-
pretation of their views in the light of modern metaethical
categories. As students of political philosophy are well
aware, it is not easy to interpret even Western political
philosophies, especially of the past, in the language of mod-
ern analytic philosophy and place them into the various meta-
ethical categories I shall mention. For example, Thomas
Hobbes' writings contain many passage which, taken by them-
selves, would classify him into each of the three metaethical
categories. He may be classified as an intuitionist because
he spoke of natural law in the following terms:
6A law of nature, lex naturalis
. is a precept or
general rule, found out by reason, by which a manis forbidden to do that which is destructive of
life, or taketh away the means of preserving
the same; and to omit that by which he thinketh it
may be best preserved.
4
He appears to take a naturalist view when he asserts
that "all men agree on this, that peace is good, and there-
fore also the way, or means of peace.. .are good; that is to
say, moral virtues ; and their contrary vices , evil. Now the
science of virtue and vice is moral philosophy; and therefore
the true doctrine of the laws of nature, is the true moral
philosophy. Hobbes, however, contradicts these cognitivist
views and affirms the metaethics of noncognitivism in the
following passage:
But whatsoever is the object of any man's appetite
or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth
good ; and the object of his hate and aversion. evil ;
and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable
.
For
these words of good, evil, and contemptible, are
ever used with relation to the person that useth
them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so;
nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken
from the nature of the objects themselves.
6
The writings of John Stuart Mill present a similar
problem. As an exponent of the definist theory that 'good'
7means 'happiness' and 'x is desirable' means the same as
x is desired'
,
Mill must be classified as a cognitivist.
His cognitivist view is brought out in statements such asi
The only proof capable of being given that an
object is visible, is that people actually see
it* • o • In like manner, I apprehend, the sole
evidence it is possible to produce that anything
is desirable, is that people do actually desire
it...* No reason can be given why the general
happiness is desirable except that each person,
so far as he believes it to be attainable, de-
sires his own happiness* This, however, being
a fact, we have not only all the proof which the
case admits of, but all which it is possible to
require, that happiness is a good: that each
person's happiness is a good to that person, and
the general happiness, therefore, a good to the
aggregate of all persons.
?
But as pointed out by Felix E 0 Oppenheim, Mill "comes
at least close to taking the noncognitivist position" when
he asserts that "questions of ultimate ends are not amenable
to direct proof. Whatever can be proven to be good, must
be so by being shown to be a means to something admitted to
be good without proof," and that "the method ... of ethics
can be no other than that of art," as distinguished from
science.
^
It is even more difficult to interpret and classify
8Chinese political philosophies, especially the pre-modem
ones this way, without risking the accusation of placing
them in a modem Procrustean bed. I do not wish to minimize
the difficulties involved in such an undertaking. It cannot
be denied that the linguistic and cultural differences be-
tween East and West are indeed great and that Chinese polit-
ical philosophers rarely think and speak in terms which are
familiar to the students of modern analytic philosophy.
To recognize these differences and difficulties, however,
is not to subscribe to the thesis that it is impossible to
classify various political philosophies of Chinese thinkers
into modern metaethical categories or that it is futile to
apply the methods of modern analytical philosophy to the
study of Chinese political philosophy. While it is true that
the metaethical theory of any well-known Chinese political
philosopher differ from that of any great Western political
philosopher in some respects, it is false to conclude that
they are unique in all respects. For example, it cannot be
denied that there are some Chinese political philosophers
who, like some of their counterparts in the West, maintain
that certain basic principles of political ethics can be
9imown to be objectively true or false on the basis of moral
insight. Similarly, there are political philosophers in
China as well as in the West who claim that normative prin-
ciples oc politics can be derived from factual generaliza-
tions. For the purpose of this study, these similarities
are significant because they are relevant to the question
whether and how basic normative principles of politics can
be shown to be objectively true or false.
Moreover, I believe it is well worthwhile to apply the
concepts of modern analytical philosophy to the study of
Chinese political philosophy because they are in my judgment
excellent tools for arriving at an analytical understanding,
a critical assessment, and a comparative perspective of dif-
ferent systems of Chinese political philosophy.
It might be objected that the language used by some
Chinese philosophers does not distinguish explicitly 'is'
and 'ought'. The reply is that if we apply these modern
metaethical concepts we must make this distinction regardless
of the actual language used by them.
10
D
* I.foe Original Works and Translations
In the long history of Chinese political philosophy,
many Chinese political thinkers have advanced various an-
swers to the question of this study. It is however impos-
sible for a study of this nature to include all "great”
political philosophers. In the selection of the works of
Chinese political thinkers to be discussed, I have been
guided by two considerations. First, the works must provide
explicit, or at least implicit, arguments for one or the
other of the alternative metaethical views. And it is for
this reason that I shall not consider the philosophy of
Confucius even though it has influenced many of the philoso-
phers covered in this study. The only reliable source of
his philosophy, the Analects of Confucius , contains few
metaethical arguments which are relevant to the topic of
this study. Second, these works must be widely known to the
educated Chinese in general and to the students of Chinese
political philosophy in particular. In fact, many of the
works cited in this study were, and some still are, required
readings at various levels of Chinese education. Some of
11
the ethical and metaethical doctrines contained therein re-
ceived the official blessing when they were regarded as cor-
rect theories in such competitive public examinations as the
college entrance examination or the civil service examina-
tion. For example, the Book of Mencius and the Great Learn-
ing;, together with other Confucian Classics, were the basis
of the civil service examinations from 1313 to 1905. The
influence of Chu Hsi's political philosophy is exemplified
by the fact that in 1313 an imperial decree ordered that his
and Ch'eng I* s commentaries on the Four Books and the Five
Classics be the standard official interpretations and the
basis for the civil service examinations. Sun Yat-sen's San
Min Chu I or the Three Principles of the People is a required
reading at colleges and universities in the Republic of China
and is a subject in its civil service examinations. In the
People's Republic of China almost everyone who can read is
expected, if not required, to study a certain portion of the
Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung .
A further difficulty is that the authenticity of some
ancient texts used in this study has been challenged by many
scholars. I have spent an enormous amount of time reading
12
contradictory arguments on this matter, but have decided
against making any reference to them in order to save space
and to avoid distraction from the main issue of this inquiry.
For the purposes of this study, it is not of vital importance
to decide (if it can be decided at all) whether a work at-
tributed to a thinker is in fact his own work. I maintain
in this study that a certain metaethical view is expressed
in a book that bears the name of a thinker or in a book at-
tributed to him. However, I shall not make use of any mate-
rial which has been proven conclusively to be an interpola-
tion.
As a study to be written in English, I wish that there
were accurate translations of all the original works used in
this study. Unfortunately, only a limited number of trans-
lations are available, and they are often inadequate for a
philosophical analysis that demands precision in rendering
original works. With the exception of the official transla-
tion of the works of Mao Tse-tung which requires relatively
few corrections, I have found it necessary to translate the
passages cited in this study myself. However, I have bene-
fitted greatly from the available translations® To give due
13
credit to the translations which I have consulted and to
provide a guide to those who wish to explore further, I have
indicated these translations in footnotes. In this connec-
tion, I must mention an excellent collection of translations
which I have consulted from time to time but have mentioned
specifically in footnotes only in a few instances. It is A
Source Book in Chinese Philosophy by Wing-tsit Chan,^
Translating Chinese philosophical works into English
proves to be a difficult task. Many Chinese philosophical
terms have no adequate synonyms in English. For example,
'tao' ) literally means 'way' or 'path'. It has been
used to designate empirical laws of things and human affairs,
a rational means to a given end, and various basic principles
of political ethics similar to the "law of nature" in West-
ern philosophy. It has been translated as the ’Way* or the
'Truth' or 'Tao'. Similarly, it is almost impossible to
find a synonym for Li ( ), a key term of Neo-Confucianism.
It has been translated variously as 'law', 'reason', 'order'
or 'principle'. These and some other terms are so compli-
cated in their meanings that they cannot be adequately trans-
lated or transliterated into English without some explanations.
14
I shall therefore devote some space to clarify the meanings
of these terms at appropriate places.
E * Value-cognitivism and Its Denial
The various and often conflicting theories which have
been advanced by both Chinese and Western political philos-
ophers in answer to the question whether or not certain basic
principles of political ethics can be shown to be objectively
true or false may be divided into two categories! value-cog-
nitivism and value-noncognitivism.
i. Value
-Cognitivism
The metaethical theory of value-cognitivism affirms
that basic moral principles are, and can be shown to be,
objectively true or false. But how the goodness of a state
of affairs and rightness of a political action can be known
is answered differently by the two schools of value-cognitiv-
ism: intuitionism and naturalism. Value-cognitivists of dif-
ferent schools or even the same school also often differ as
to what basic normative principles of politics are objectively
true or false
15
Naturalism
. Naturalism in general holds that certain
moral principles can be shown to be true or false because
moral judgments just state a special subclass of facts about
the natural world1 or because moral principles can somehow
be reduced to true descriptive generalizations. According to
William K. Frankena,
many philosophers have sought to show that certain
moral and other value judgments are actually rooted
in fact or, as it used to be put, in "the nature of
thing11 .... One who follows this line of thought,
however, seems to be committed to claiming that eth-
ical and value judgments can be derived logically
from factual ones, empirical or nonempirical.H
In contrast to this simpler form of naturalism, a more
sophisticated form of naturalism, known as the definist theo-
ry, holds that "ethical terms can be defined in terms of non-
ethical ones, and ethical sentences can be translated into
nonethical ones of a factual kind."^ In other words, it
holds that "an ethical or value judgment simply is an asser-
tion of a fact-- that ethical and value terms constitute merely
an alternative vocabulary for reporting facts. For example,
’good* is said to mean the same as *what is conducive to
pleasure*. Given this definition, judgments about the good-
16
ness of actions or states of affairs are factual judgments
about the quantity (and/or quality) of pleasure they produce.
Good or right has also been defined to mean 'what is de-
sired or approved’ by the majority, by the 'experts' or by
the speaker. Given this definition, judgments about goodness
rightness are again factual judgments.
If either form of naturalism is correct, then ethical
judgments can be justified by empirical investigation just
as ordinary factual statements can.
Intuitionism
. Intuitionism holds that certain basic
moral principles are true, and they "can be seen to be true
by any person with the necessary insight. According to this
view, a person who can grasp the truth of true ethical gen-
eralizations does not accept them as the result of a process
of ratiocination; he just sees without argument that they
are and must be true, and true of all possible worlds.
Some intuitionists agree with definists that ethical
terms stand for properties of things. However, intuition-
ists
deny that the properties referred to by words like
"good" and "ought” are definable in nonethical
17
terms. In fact, they insist that some of theseSfieS ^ *Udefinable ^ simple and unana-lyzable, as yellowness and pleasantness.... Butthey are not natural or empirical properties as
are pleasantness and yellowness. They are of a
very different kind, being non-natural or non-
empirical and, so to speak, normative rather than
^actual.... According to this view, as for the
e inists, ethical and value judgments are true
or false; but they are not factual and cannot bejustified by empirical observation or metaphysical
reasoning, fhe basic ones, particular or general,
are self-evident and can only be known by intui-
tion; this follows, it is maintained, from the
fact that the properties involved are simple and
non-natural. lJ
schools of intuitionism, however, disagree
with one another about how the quality of goodness and right-
ness in general and the quality of political goodness and
rightness in particular can be known. As we shall see, in-
tuitionists like Lao Tzu and Mencius maintain that the qual-
ity of goodness and rightness can be known, not by the five
senses which every normal human being possesses, but by a
moral sense which, according to Mencius, all men are endowed
with at the time of birth, or, according to Lao Tzu, can be
attained by most, if not all, after arduous efforts in ac-
cordance with his prescription.
Some intuitionists hold that religious insight is a
18
valid method to prove the truth or falsity of basic prin-
ciples or political ethics. A third group of intuitionists
maintains that certain normative principles of politics are
known to be true, not by moral or religious insight, but by
rational insight. According to Chu Hsi, the most influential
leader of the rationalistic school" of Neo-Confucianism,
reason with the aid of other faculties "necessarily knows"
what is objectively right or wrong,
ii. Value-Noncognitivism
Value-noncognitivism holds that "basic ethical principles
have no cognitive status; they cannot be known to be either
true or false because they are not true or false; and they
are neither true nor false because they do not affirm or deny
that something is the case,"-^
Noncognitivists maintain that ethical terms such as
'good' or 'evil' and 'right' or 'wrong' do not designate any
property, and ethical judgments in which these and similar
ethical terms occur are not statements that assert or deny
that something is the case. If moral statements neither af-
firm nor deny that something is the case, then they cannot
be either true or false. In the words of Alfred Jules Ayer,
19
one of the most influential exponents of this view (which is
known as "the emotive theory of value11 ),
ln saying that a certain type of action is right
or wrong, I am not making any factual statement
not even a statement about my own state of mind!
I am expressing certain moral sentiments.... It is
worth mentioning that ethical terms do not serve
only to express feeling. They are calculated also
to arouse feeling, and so to stimulate action. In-
deed some of them are used in such a way as to
give the sentences in which they occur the effect
of commands.... If a sentence makes no statement
at all, there is obviously no sense in asking
whether what it says is true or false. 17
For example, the term ’wrong' in the statement 'killing
under x condition is wrong and the 'right* in the statement
Killing under x condition is right' express the speaker's
approval or disapproval of killing under a certain circum-
stance. The disagreement between those who maintain the for-
mer position and those hold the latter is, according to
Charles L. Stevenson, a "disagreement in attitude. They
may agree on all relevant facts about a specific case of
killing and yet still disagree as to the rightness or wrong-
ness of the action. Some of them may maintain that human
life should not be taken under any circumstances. Others
20
may argue that human life, whether actual Qr potential> may
be taken if it is necessary, for example, to protect the
life of the mother, to prevent the pain of old age, to pro-
mote the welfare of the family (or state)
,
to maintain the
purity of race, etc. Noncognitivists maintain that
Fundamental moral disputes cannot be resolvedm any objective way, and fundamental moral
claims cannot be inductively established or deductively proven or demonstrated in any other
way. Morality is not a matter of knowledge. 19
More recently, noncognitivists have come to emphasize
the prescriptive aspect of ethical language. According to
them, ethical language performs the function of commending
or condemning a certain action or kind of action. It gives
advice or guides action. R. M, Hare, a representative
spokesman for this prescriptive theory holds that
the primary function of the word 'good* is to
commend... o When we commend or condemn anything,
it is always in order, at least indirectly, to
guide choices, our own or other people's, now or
in the future. 20
Unlike the emotive theory which emphasize the attitude-
expressing and attitude-evoking aspect of moral language, the
21
prescriptive theory stresses the social function of ethical
statements. "What makes an utterance normative is precisely
its dynamism, its trigger function; a normative utterance is
an utterance that guides conduct and molds or alters attitude ."21
^ of the Proposed Analysis
This study is organized according to the metaethical
theories of various Chinese political philosophers and not
according to the chronological order of their appearance in
history.
In Chapter Two, I will analyze Chinese political phi-
losophers who subscribe to the metaethics of intuitionism
based on moral, religious, and rational insights. Next, I
take up thinkers representing two forms of naturalism.
In Chapter Four, I shall examine value-noncognitivism in
Chinese political philosophy. In the concluding chapter, I
shall give a brief summary of this analysis and its implica-
tions.
Evidently, my purpose is not to make an original con-
tribution to metaethics. I propose to apply the methods of
22
analytic philosophy to the study of a particular area of
Chinese political theory, namely, political ethics. My
objective is to provide an analytic interpretation and a
critical understanding of different Chinese political phi-
losophies which are often grouped under Confucianism, Neo-
Confucianism, Moism, Taoism, Legalism, Socialism, and Com-
raunism.
In this effort, I shall try to give an accurate presen-
tation of these philosophies and state my criticisms. I am
convinced that only one of the conflicting metaethical the-
ories can be correct. To present these conflicting theories
without stating which I consider the correct one is, it seems
to me, to shrink from making a judgment in this matter. A
statement of my criticism perhaps will also serve to stimulate
further discussions among the students of Chinese political
philosophy and thereby indirectly help to increase our under-
standing of this crucial problem. To this end, I believe it
is worthwhile to state my views in this analysis.
23
CHAPTER II
INTUITION ISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL ETHICS
The metaethical theory of intuitionism holds that basic
ethical terms such as 'good' or 'right' stand for "non-natu-
ral properties" which are simple, indefinable or unanalyzable.
According to this theory, ethical statements and value judg-
ments can be objectively true or false because they are
statements asserting these properties or ascribing these
properties to things, Intuitionists maintain that the qual-
ity of goodness or rightness, unlike natural properties such
as yellowness and pleasantness which can be known by sense
experience, can only be apprehended by a certain kind of in-
tuition, Consequently, basic principles of political ethics
can be known to be objectively true or false, not by empiri-
cal observation, but by insight,
Intuitionists, however, differ with one another about
the kind of intuition which enables men to attain true moral
knowledge. In this chapter we shall examine the political
philosophies of some eminent Chinese intuitionists who main-
tain that certain basic normative principles of politics can
be known to be objectively true by moral or religious or
rational insight*
24
A, Based on Moral Insight
i. Lao Tzu
Lao Tzu (b. 570 B.C,?), the founder of Taoism, has been
classified as a naturalist by most authors 0 Such a classi-
fication, however, is based on his ethical position rather
than on his metaethical position. To eliminate this confus-
ing and misleading designation, he may be called an ethical
naturalist and a metaethical intuitionist.
Lao Tzu 1 s Ethical Principles , Lao Tzu is an ethical
naturalist in the sense that he advocates the moral principle
that men ought to follow the Tao or Way of Nature by leading
a simple, ’’natural,” and primitive way of life. This is the
consensus of more than fifteen authors whom I have consulted.
However, no single Chinese equivalent for the word 'ought,'
one of the most important “trade marks" of an ethical-norma-
tive statement in Western philosophy, occurs in the entire
book of the Lao Tzu
. His moral principles, like those of
25
some Western philosophers, are couched in the form of empir
ical generalizations, often using terms having a laudatory
connotation. He says, for example,
Man patterns himself after [the Way of]
The Earth patterns itself after Heaven
Heaven patterns itself after Tap (Way)
*
Tao patterns itself after Nature .
*
the Earth,
Grammatically, this passage looks and sounds like "the
young men in the United States pattern their hair style af-
ter the Beatles'." The grammatical appearance, however, is
deceptive. The latter sentence is empirical because it con-
tains only descriptive terms: The verb 'pattern' is used to
describe the making or fashioning of their hairs according to
the hair style of the Beatles. The same word 'pattern' and
'the Way of the Earth,' 'Heaven' and 'Nature' in Lao Tzu's
statement are not used in the empirical sense, but in a nor-
mative-ethical sense. The 'Tao' or 'Way' refers to those,
and only those, ways which, in Lao Tzu's judgment, are good
and which men ought to imitate. The verb 'pattern' is being
used to prescribe that men ought to act according to the Way
or Tao which is good rather than to describe that men actually
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do so The word ’pattern' is a translation of the Chinese
word fS (H ) or 'law'. According to Chinese and English
dictionaries, 'law' means, among other things, a binding
rule of conduct, and 'pattern' means "something regarded as
a normative example to be copied" or "a model accepted or
proposed for imitation." As a verb, as it is used in the
passage quoted, it means to act according to the pattern or
law, which, in this context, is the Tao of the Earth, Heaven,
and Nature. Thus, the whole passage acquires a normative
character
o
One of the favorite techniques employed by all Chinese
moral philosophers except a few modern moralists is to put
their own moral principles into the mouth of the Sage(s) or
to present their own normative principles of politics in the
form of historical statements to the effect that they were
the political ethics of the ancient sages. Since the Sage
(who usually remains unidentified) is regarded as the perfect
moral model for all men in Chinese culture, an evocation of
his words or actions, actual or alleged, becomes in effect
a Chinese way of stating indirectly that acting this way is
right. Thus, when Lao Tzu says that “the Sage manages the
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affairs of non-action (wu^wei
,
^ , literally inactivity)
and practices the teaching of quietude,'-2 lt is UIHnistaka.
ble to the Chinese reader that he is exhorting all men, es-
pecially all rulers and government officials, to practice
the teaching, oi quietude. This reading is supported by his
assertion that "the good man is (which here means: ought to
be) the teacher of the bad," and that "the man of superior
virtue practices non-action, and he does so without ulterior
motive; the man of inferior virtue takes action, and he does
so with ulterior motive." 3 The Sage is, of course, a "good
man" and a man of " superior" virtue,,
According to Lao Tzu, wu-wei or "non-action" is the Tao
of Nature. It does not mean "inactivity" in the literal sense
but rather taking no action that is contrary to the Way of
Nature. To practice "non- action," therefore, means to follow
the Way of Nature, The teaching of quietude is an applica-
tion of the principle of "non-action" in the area of educa-
tion in the broad sense of the term, and is intended by Lao
Tzu to counter the rival doctrine which stresses the active
study of language, books and techniques of argumentation.
If the Way of Nature is good and "non-action" is the Way
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of Nature as Lao Tzu maintains, then a ruler who practices
"non-action" is a good ruler. This is his conclusion. He
pronounces that the best ruler is the one who knows the Tao
and follows it by doing the least governing 0
The best of all the rulers is the one whose
existence the people are barely aware of 0
The next best is one who is loved aid praised.
The next is one who is feared.
The next is one who is despised.
When there is not enough faith in others,
They will have no faith in him.
With great concern, [the best ruler] values his
own words.
When his task is accomplished and work done,
The people all say, "He is natural (tkj-ian .&jfl ." 4
His ideal society is a small state in which the people,
who have few desires, little knowledge and no ambition, lead
a peaceful, inactive, and simple way of life
.
5
Lao Tzu there-
fore condemns any conscious attempt by men to interfere with
the Way of Nature and what he believed to be the "natural way
of life." To advocate any non-Taoistic moral principles is
to make such an attempt. He is particularly critical of the
basic Confucian moral principles such as "humanity," filial
piety, and "righteousness," and the basic Confucian values
such as wisdom and loyalty. He declares that they are the
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products of degeneration following the fall of men from the
"natural way of life ." 6
Moral Insight and the Tan. But what is Tao? And how it
is known? Lao Tzu used the term 'tao' in two different
senses without distinguishing them, namely the normative
and descriptive senses.
Tao Ci& ) literally means the way or path by which peo-
ple reach their destination, or through figurative usage the
method or means by which men accomplish their objectives.
'Tao* in this sense is a descriptive term. When Lao Tzu
claims that non-action or non-interference is the best way
to a simple and peaceful life, he is using 'tao* in this
descriptive sense.
^
'Tao' in the moral sense involves the intrinsic moral
judgment that a certain way of life or a certain course of
action ought to be followed for its own sake by all men or
by all men with certain characteristics under certain circum-
stances
,
such as policy-makers in their public life. When
Lao Tzu says that all men ought to follow the Tao of Nature
by leading a "natural" way of life, not as a means to some
other end, but as an end in itself because it is desirable
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for its own sake, he is using 'tao 1 in the normative sense.
To distinguish the two senses of 'tao 1
,
I shall use small
letters for the descriptive and capital letters for the nor-
mative sense,
Lao Tzu takes Tao as something not unlike Plato's Form,
He says,
There is something (wu,#£? ) undifferentiated
and yet complete in itself.
It existed before Heaven and Earth.
Soundless and shapeless
, it stands alone and
does not change.
It prevails everywhere and is free from danger.
It may be considered as the mother of the universe.
I do not know its name,
I styled it Tao
.
An.cl in the absence of a better word named it Great. ®
Tao as the mother of the universe may remind Western
readers oj_ Platonic Ultimate Reality in contradistinction to
the illusory world of phenomena
.
9 While Plato maintains
that the form of Goodness is "perfectly real" and "perfectly
knowable ,"10 Lao Tzu holds that "Tao is a thing which is
elusive and vague. Elusive and vague, yet there is in it a
form (hsiang
. ^ ). Elusive and vague, yet there is in it a
0
thing (wu,^)." 11
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Tao is not only elusive and vague, it cannot even be
adequately discussed. For Lao Tzu insists that "The Tao
that can be talked about is not the eternal Tao." 1? Even
so, he dwelled on Tao at great length. If this seems para-
doxical to some students of Lao Tzu's philosophy, it is be-
cause they equate the difficulty of putting the true eternal
Tao into conventional language with the impossibility of
knowing the Tao. While Lao Tzu admitted the inadequacy of
language, he holds that the Tao is not beyond the reach of
certain men with special faculties
.
13
The question is by what faculty? The following passage
provides his answer.
Without stepping beyond one's doors,
One can know the world.
Without peeping through one's window.
One can see (chien, £ ) the Tao of Nature.
The further one goes,
The less one knows.
Therefore the sages know without travelling,
Apprehend (ming
. % ) without looking
,
14 and
Accomplish without any action.
Lao Tzu used the term 'see* to refer to the discovery of
the Tao of Nature. His conclusion that the sages "apprehend
without looking” suggest^ however, that the Tao is not dis-
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red by the use of our eyes. Since the passage quoted
does not refer to sense perception. Lao Tzu can only be un-
derstood to be "seen" by so.e sixth or .oral sense. This
interpretation is supported by the way he described the
thread of Tao" or the essence of Tao
. It reads,
We look at it but cannot see it;
Its name is the Invisible.
We listen to it but cannot hear it;
Its name is the Inaudible.
We grasp it but cannot get it;
Its name is the Subtle.
These three cannot be further inquired into-
They therefore fuse into one.
Its upper part is not bright.
And its lower part not obscure.
Infinite and boundless,
It cannot be given any name.
It returns to nothingness.
This is called the shape without a shape,
form (hsiang.
^ ) without substance.
This is called the vague and elusive.
Go toward it and we cannot see its head;
Follow it and we cannot see its back.^6
And in another passage he said, "The words uttered by
Tao are insipid and flavorless. We look (shlh .^^ ) at Tao .
p
but it cannot be seen.^ We listen to it, but it cannot be
heard
. Yet if you use it, it is inexhaustible.
Since the Tao is invisible, it can only be apprehended
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by the moral sense. Even this moral sense is not arailable
to all. Only the moral sense of those who have attained the
utmost vacuity” and "genuine quietude" can "see" the true
19
Tap.
iio Mencius JLq) and Wang Yang-Ming (2
In contrast to Lao Tzu's position that true moral intu-
ition is available only to those who have attained the utmost
vacuity and genuine quietude, Mencius (372-289 B.C.), the
founder of what is known as the idealistic school of Confu-
cianism, maintains that all men possess innate knowledge of
right and wrong and the innate ability to do what is right.
He uses the theory of innate knowledge to establish the in-
trinsic rightness of acting according to the principle of
humanity (or benevolence) and righteousness (or justice)
,
and relies on descriptive definitions of value terms as well
as empirical generalizations to establish the normative prin-
ciple that certain human dispositions, traits of character
or feelings are good and ought to be cultivated. The former
is a form of intuitionism and the latter represents a type
of naturalism. In this section I shall examine his version
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Of intuitionlsm; his version of naturalism will be discussed
in the following chapter.
Innate Knowledge of Moral Mencius defines
innate knowledge and innate ability in the following terms:
The ability possessed by men without having been
acquired^ by learning is innate ability (liang-
fc M ) > and the knowledge possessed by men
^
e
^
iberation is innate knowledge (liang-
chih
, g £i) 0 Children carried in the arms all
ks2H to love their parents, and as they gro^Tthey
^ kM”* to respect their elder brothers. To have
affection for parents is humanity (jen, ^ , be-
nevolence)
,
and to respect elders is righteousness
» justice). These are universal in the world
without exception .
^
In other words, Mencius maintains that all men are en-
dowed with the knowledge of right and wrong and they have
the natural tendency to act according to what is right, which,
for Mencius, means acting according to the principles of hu-
manity and righteousness. This interpretation is confirmed
by another key passage:
All men have the hsin (/C
,
literally, heart) of
compassion; all men have the hsin of shame and
dislike; all men have the hsin of humility and
reverence; and all men have the hsin of right and
wrong. The hsin of compassion is humanity; the
hsin of shame and dislike is righteousness; the
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ya \
.
utility and reverence is propriety (lT
^F)> and the hsin of right and wY*r*n & -f ?(chlh 'j Humor,,-
7
s
,
31101 is wisdomHumanity, righteousness, proprietvand wisdom are not gilded onto us from without*
2 ~gntlZ P° S °eS- (^> ® ^ > them. [People
upon°this°matter.21
CaUSe
^ they have not refl
-ted
iiSiS (Aj ) literally means ’heart 1
. It is often ren-
dered as ’feeling’. But neither ’heart’ nor ’feeling’ is
an adequate translation of what Mencius intended to say.
What he means by this word is the natural disposition to
know what is right and wrong. The hsin is therefore the
seat of innate moral knowledge, at least when it functions
as "the heart of right and wrong," although Mencius did not
say so explicitly. Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529)
,
a leader of
the idealistic school of Neo-Confucianism who reaffirmed the
| ai metaethical position, unequivocally identifies the
hsin with the innate knowledge.
The hsin of right and wrong knows without delib-
eration and it can do so without having acquired
it by learning. This is what is called innate
knowledge. 22
The hsin or heart in this moral sense cannot be rendered
as 'feeling*. In Wang Yang-ming' s words,
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Sentiment U.f ) and innate knowledge must heclearly distinguished. All that idef! Tf' %includes thoughts, desires
in response to things
sentiment may be right or wrong That wMeh •
capable of knowing the right and wrong of fsen-
rhe
nt calle
f
lnnate knowledge. If you followt innate knowledge, nothing can be wrong. 23
In this sense, Mencius' hsin, like the heart for Jean-
Jacques Kousseau, 24 is the source, or "the root" in Mencian
25terms, of man's ethical knowledge,,
According to Mencius, men ought to act in accordance
with the moral principles known to them through their innate
knowledge. Since he believes that all men possess both innate
knowledge of right and wrong and the innate ability to do
what is right, he condemns those who refuse to acknowledge
the validity of the true moral principles and those who re-
fuse to act accordingly.
Men have these Four Beginnings [of humanity,
righteousness, propriety, and wisdom] just as
they have their four limbs. When a man, who
has these Four Beginnings, proclaims that he
cannot practice them, he is robbing himself. He
who proclaims that his ruler cannot practice
them is robbing his ruler. 26
In his judgment, the major function of government ought
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to be to create and maintain an environment conducive to
the fullest development of the Four Beginnings or Four Vir-
tues. Economic measures, educational systems, and basic
welfare programs deemed necessary for the goal were spelled
out in some details by Menciuso^
According to Mencius, political authority should be
placed in the hands of those who have developed these vir-
tues and who have the ability and will to practice the
"kingly way" or "the way of the true king" (wang-tao . ^
which, in contrast to "the way of the hegemonic tyrant" (j£-
tao,^$^), contains the principles of humane or benevolent
government (jen-cheng .^ ) „ 28 His argument is: "I have
not heard of one who bent himself [i a e», violated the true
moral principles], and yet was able to straighten others;
how much less of one who disgraced himself and yet rectified
the whole world." 2 ^
iii. Objections to Intuitionism Based on Moral Insight .
The intuitionism of Lao Tzu, Mencius and Wang Yang-ming
affirms that basic ethical terms refer to certain non-natural
properties whose objective existence can be known by moral
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insight. If basic ethical terms referred to certain non-
naturai properties as they maintained, then it would be
self-contradictory for a man to affirm that an action or a
state of affairs has one of the non-natural properties spec-
ified by one of them and deny that it is good, or to main-
tain that something which does not have any of the non-natu-
ral properties they have specified is good. It cannot be
denied, however, that there are people who maintain that
something which does not have any of the properties speci-
fied by Lao Tzu, Mencius and Wang Yang-ming is good 0 For
example, hedonists maintain that happiness (or pleasure) is
good* The intuitionists of course deny that
hedonists (and all those who do not have moral insight) can
have the true knowledge of goodness. They assert that moral
insight is the only method to gain the true knowledge of
goodness. This position, however, makes ethical judgments
unverifiable to all who deny that intuition is a source of
objective knowledge.
Those who affirm that something has the alleged non-
natural property specified by one of the three intuitionists
and deny that it is good or right are in effect challenging
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the validity of one intuition by another intuition. This
is an instance of conflicting intuitions which cannot be
settled by appealing to moral intuition. For what if A
claims to know with absolute certainty that to promote his
own greatest good by leading a "natural way of life” regard-
less of what may happen to other people is intrinsically
right and ought to be done, whereas B claims to know with
equal absolute certainty that to love all men including his
enemy is intrinsically right and that government ought to
take all necessary actions to promote the welfare of all?
*- s possible to test the validity of a claim that
one is able to see something which is not seen by others
because he has reached a certain altitude, there is no way
to test whether one has seen the Tao with his moral sense.
The so-called "truth serum" or "lie detecting machine" will
not be able to help, for most, if not all, moral philosophers
of this school honestly believe that they have eliminated
selfish desires, attained "utmost vacuity," and maintained
"genuine quietude" in accordance with Lao Tzu's instruction,
and that they have really "seen" the true Tao . As an honest
and convinced moral philosopher, each can be expected to
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claim that those who disagreed with him have not seen the
true Tao, and he alone or he and those who agreed with him
alone have seen the genuine Tao. But this type of argument
amounts to nothing more than a claim of the subjective cer-
tainty of his own intuition without proving in any way the
validity of the moral " statement” in question.
In the similar situation, Mencius and Wang Yang-ming
cannot legitimately question the validity of those who in-
tuited the basic moral principles which differ from their
own moral principles, for both have maintained, as we have
seen, that all men possess innate moral knowledge. Mencius
attempts to solve the problem of conflicting intuitions by
four types of argument. First, he declares that his serious
moral opponents, such as Mo Tzu and Yang Chu, are "birds and
beasts (ch* in- shou . 'M'-j&O n implying that they are not men
who, according to his own theory, possess innate moral knowl-
edge. J It is an easy way out, but no arbitrary declaration,
however, can deny the biological fact that his moral opponents
are men. Second, he maintains that a man may abandon or lose
his innate knowledge.^ If so, Mencius may claim that the
moral insights of certain men are false. But this argument
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contradicts his assertion that all men have the same innate
moral knowledge. Even if we were to accept the contention
that all men originally had such a knowledge but some of
them lost it thereafter, we are not provided with any ob-
jective criterion by which to determine who has and who has
not lost his innate moral knowledge. Third, Mencius also
speaks of the quantitative differences in the development of
the Four Virtues, including the "heart of right and wrong.”
In regard to them, he says.
Some men have twice as much as others, some five
times as much, and some to an incalculable amount,
because some men did not develop their natural en-
dowments to the fullest extent. 32
It is not clear whether Mencius intends to say that
there are quantitative differences in the development of
man 1 s innate moral knowledge
.
Wang Yang-ming, who, as already pointed out, shares
Mencius' metaethical position, denies any differences in
man's innate knowledge. He asserts that
The innate knowledge is in the heart of all men
and without differences between the sage and the
blockhead. The whole world, past and present,
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has it in common. If the gentlemen of the world
iniL^te i t^emS6lueS t0 the extension of then ate Imowledge, then they shall be able to
sshare with all the universal right and wrong
share their likes and dislikes in common, lookupon other people as their own, look upoA the
Earth^and l0°k Upon Heaven,h a the myriad things as one body. To seek
a world without order, then, will not be possible. 33
If Mencius does indeed implicitly claim that men differ
in the development of their innate knowledge, the question
then is whether an objective measurement of its development
is possible. Mencius did not provide, and he could not have
provided, any objective method to measure the development of
man's innate knowledge. In the absence of an objective cri-
terion, competing claims of what is right and wrong cannot be
objectively settled on the ground of differences in the de-
velopment of the contestants' innate moral knowledge.
fourth, both Mencius and Wang Yang-ming also resorted
to the argument that man's innate knowledge may be obscured
by selfish desires. Our criticisms of Lao Tzu apply also
to this position. Furthermore, by declaring that his moral
rivals were obscured by selfish desires, ^5 Wang Yang-ming
pronounces in effect that a man's innate knowledge is unob-
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structed if, and only if, it knows that the principles of
humanity and righteousness are the true moral principles.
Since these principles are Wang Yang-ming's (and Mencius')
own moral principles, this means simply, "you have the unob-
structed innate moral knowledge if, and only if, you agree
and accept my moral principles."
Since Lao Tzu, Mencius, and Wang Yang-ming all fail to
provide any objective, i.e., intersubjective, criterion by
which to decide the truth and falsity of competing moral
insights, I conclude that their moral insights do not yield
objective ethical knowledge.
B » Based on Religious Insight : Mo Tzu )
One of the most striking contrasts between the history
of Chinese and Western political thought is the fact that
there are few prominent political philosophers among reli-
gious leaders or theologians in the former, with the excep-
tion of Mo Tzu (468-376 B.C.?), the founder of Moism as a
religion as well as a school of philosophy. Moism was one
of the greatest schools of philosophy in ancient China which
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provided a serious if relatively temporary challenge to Con
fucianism from the fifth to the third century B.C.
Universal Love and Condemnation nf The key Stone
of Mo Tzu's religion as well as his philosophy is the will
of Heaven (i.e.
,
the will of an anthropomorphic God).
The will of Heaven is to me like the compass to
the wheelwright and the square to the carpenter.The wheelwright and the carpenter use the compass
and square to measure all circles and squares inthe world, saying, that which agrees with the
standard is right, and that which does not is
wrong. Now the writings of the scholars and gen-tlemen of the world are too numerous to be loadedin carts and the doctrines and speeches they have
produced are too numerous to be enumerated. They
try to persuade the feudal lords above and various
minor officials below. But as to humanity andjustice, they are far, far off the mark. How do
I know? I say: I have found the shining standard
,
law, i.e.
,
the will of Heaven) in the
world to measure them. 3
6
ihe will oi. Heaven is Mo fzu* s moral compass and square
with which he measures “the governing activities of kings,
feudal lords and other officials above, the myriad people of
the world below, and literature, doctrines and debates.^' It
is the standard of good and evil, right and wrong. To him,
that which is in accord with the will of Heaven is good, and
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thst which is not is evil .3
3
According to Mo Tzu, the will of Heaven enjoins uni-
versal love and forbids wars. He has defended his basic
moral principles on at least five different grounds, of
which only one may be properly said to be based on religious
insight. Since he used all five grounds to "demonstrate"
that these principles were the will of Heaven, I shall ex-
amine all of them.
By universal love (chien-ai . ) Mo Tzu means loving
all men without distinction, not only in the sense that
every man ought to love all others equally regardless of
their biological and social relationships with him, but that
he loves all others to the same degree and the same way as
he loves himself. His principle of universal love enjoins
everyone "to love others as he loves himself ,"39 ^ *» t0
regard other people's countries as his own, regard other
people's families as his own, and regard other people's
bodies as his own. 11^ He therefore condemns those who "know
only to love their own states, family, and body" and not
those of others. He did so because they would have violated
the will of Heaven, which "wants men to mutually love and
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benefit one another, and does not want them to mutually
hate or injure one another,”^
If the will of Heaven enjoins all men to act according
to the principles of mutual love and mutual benefit, and
forbids mutual hatred and mutual injury, then wars, espe-
cially offensive wars, are clear violations of the will of
Heaven. While it may be argued that a nation may out of
love go to war against another nation to "liberate" the
people therein from brutality, oppression, inhuman treatment,
etc.
,
the inevitable killing of the people constitutes se-
rious injury to the very people who die in the process. In
a famous chapter entitled "Condemnation of War,” he force-
fully argued that
Killing one man constitutes an injustice and [the
must receive a death sentence. According
to this doctrine, killing ten men increases the
injustice by tenfold and [the killer] must receive
ten death sentences; killing a hundred men in-
creases the injustice by a hundredfold and [the
killer] must receive a hundred death sentences.
In all these cases, the gentlemen of the world all
know to condemn it and declare, "it is unjust 1"
Now, when it comes to the greatest of all injustice,
the invasion of another nation [which involves the
killing of even more men]
,
they do not know to con-
demn it. Instead, they praise it and declare, "It
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Thei^h”
Indeed
»
they do not know it is unjustI y therefore recorded thei-r TT™~rio «- u J USL »
down to posteritv tf
rds to be handed
just, how could le explain^their re"" £ 18 Tinjustice to be handed down to posterity?^ SUCh
i’he question, however, arises whether there is a "will
of Heaven" in the first place, and if so, how can we be
sure that a specific moral principle or a specific set of
moral principles is the will of Heaven. This was the very
question Ho Tzu attempted to answer.
Knowing the Will of Heaven
. For an orderly discussion,
Mo Tzu's answers may be divided into five categories.
(!) The existence of an anthropomorphic God can be es-
tablished by what the people see and hear . If there is to
be the will of Heaven, the existence of an anthropomorphic
God must be established. But how? According to Mo Tzu, it
can be established by what the common people actually "see
and hear." He asserts that
throughout the world, the way to ascertain the
existence or non-existence of something is to
use, as a testing standard, what the eyes and
ears of the common people actually know: If they
have actually heard it and seen it, then we must
assume that it exists; if they have never heard
or seen it, then we must assume that it does not
exist. 43
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He challenges those who have any doubt about the ex-
istence and the will of supernatural beings, including that
of an anthropomorphic "Heaven" (God)
,
to go to some villages
or communities and ask. He then proceeds to produce stories
from "annals" and various "historical records" to prove his
contention.
The assertion is so patently false it is unlikely that
Mo Tzu means the "seeing” or "hearing” of the common people
in the literal sense. Mo Tzu appears to maintain that the
common people believe in the allegation of some people, pre-
sumably with some special ability, to the effect that they
have seen an anthropomorphic God and heard His will. If So,
he is no longer defending his case on ground (1) but on (2)
or (3) discussed in the following pages.
(2) The deeds of sage-kings "prove" the existence of an
anthropomorphic God
. Since Mo Tzu was fully aware of the
fact that many of his contemporaries maintained that "the
eyes and ears of the multitude cannot be trusted and are in-
sufficient to settle doubts,"^ he asked whether the words
and deeds of the ancient sage-kings could be accepted as a
standard in such matters. His own answer is: "Men who are
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above average all say, 'The sage-ki„g s of the Three Dynas-
ties of antiquity are sufficient to be a standard (f|, >| ,
law).'"45 He then went on to cite examples from oaths, dec-
larations, decrees, books, etc., which, according to his in-
terpretation, show that the sage-kings must have believed
in the existence of supernatural beings. He cites sacri-
fices offered by them on various occassions as an evidence
to support his contention. "If there are no spirits and
gods," he asks, "then why would [sage-] King Wu divide sac-
rificial duties [among feudal lords]
Contrary to Mo Tzu’s contention, neither the offering
of sacrifices nor the allocation of sacrificial duties proves
that the offerers really believed in the existence of super-
natural beings, much less that they do exist. The offerers
could be simply following the tradition or playing politics.
Even if the sage-kings truly believed that there were super-
natural beings, their belief cannot be used to prove their
existence. While belief may furnish a basis of evidence for
propositions, their truth depends, not on subjective belief,
but on inter subjectively ascertainable evidence.
(3) The wise know the will of Heaven by their religious
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insight. Mo Tzu uses yet another, and for this section a
central, argument that there are some people who, by their
special ability, know the existence, will, and power of su-
pernatural beings. These men are called chih-che or
^1?), which literally means the knower.47
According to the "Moist Canons" and the "Discourses on
the Canons, which Liang Ch'i-ch'ao attributes to Mo Tzu
and Hu Shih to Neo-Moists
,
48 the first chih (-£&) "is the
meeting of a man's intelligence and things, thereby enabling
him to describe their forms and shapes, as in seeing."49 in
other words, it is Knowledge derived from sensory experi-
ence. fhe second chih (^£), which is composed of chih (7^,
to know or perceptual knowledge) and hsin (/^, mind) is no
longer found in any of the existing Chinese dictionaries.
In the "Moist Canons" it is defined as "an insight (ming
also means clear or understanding) # n 50 it i s further ex-
plained as "discourses on things by a man's intelligence
(chih,
^
2. , which should read chih wisdom) and his knowl-
edge of them is distinct, as in insight (or understanding) ."^1
To know in this manner is to know precisely in a way de-
scribed by the Chinese ideogram: To know by mind.
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Apparently, the wise such as the sage-ki„gs of antiq.
uity mentioned in (2) and Mo Tzu himself "see" or "know"
the existence, will, and power of an anthropomorphic God,
not through perception of the regular five senses, but
through insight of their minds. For if they know through
their five senses, all the people with the five senses
should also be able to know them. Since the insight of the
wise has a religious overtone, and since Mo Tzu is the
founder of Moism as a religion, it seems justifiable to
characterize their insight as religious insight, even though
Mo Tzu himself did not use the term.
Two examples from the Mo Tzu will serve to illustrate
this line of argument and its problems. He asserts that
Upon examining the reason why the world was
brought to order, it is known that only when the
Son of Heaven (i.e„, emperor) was able to unify
the concepts of right (1,^. , also justice and
righteousness) throughout the world, was the
world brought to order. If the people all iden-
tify with the Son of Heaven but not with Heaven,
then calamity is not yet removed. The frequent
whirling winds and bitter rains nowadays are the
punishments of Heaven on the people for their
failure to identify themselves with Heaven. 52
Mo Tzu's claim that these phenomena were the punishments
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meted out by Heaven was based, not on the sensory experience
of the phenomena, but on religious insight, an insight which
allegedly enables the wise to "know" what is beyond and be-
hind the visible phenomena,.
In the area of politics, the claim is even more sweep-
ing, Mo Tzu claims that "Heaven*' (in the sense of an an-
thropomorphic God) not only enacts basic moral principles
i.or rulers to follow, but also carries out His will by re-
warding those who are faithful and punishing those who defy
His commands. Specifically, he claims that Heaven "made
(shih,^ )" the ancient sage-kings "to have the honor of
being the Son of Heaven and the wealth of the world" because
"they love universally those whom I ["Heaven"] love; they
benefit universally those whom 1 benefit," and "made" the
"wicked kings" of antiquity "unable to live out their life-
span and survive their generations" because "they discrimi-
nate and hate those whom I love; they injure alternatingly
those whom I benefit,
The question is how can we be sure that "Heaven" actu-
ally "made" such rewards and punishments? Confucianists
have persistently maintained that the same sage-kings were
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rewarded, not because of their obedience to the will of
Heaven, but because of their cultivation and faithful prac-
tice of humanity and righteousness based on a clear distinc
tion of five different relations, i.e., between father and
son, ruler and minister, husband and wife, elder and young-
er brothers, and between friends
.
54 They claimed that it
was the magnetic moral force of these men, not an anthropo-
morphic God, that turned the people toward them like all
the stars turning toward the polar star, and bent the people
like the wind blowing across the grass , 55
If religious insight is the only means by which men can
apprehend the existence, will, and power of an anthropomor-
phic God and the true moral principles, then the knowledge
of these matters is available only to those who are endowed
with true religious insight. Agnostics, atheists, and most
of the faithful religious followers can never hope to have
any knowledge of these same matters. In fact, they have no
way of knowing whether or not those who claim to have true
religious insight do indeed possess such religious insight,
for it takes another religious insight to know whether it is
the case. And whenever there are conflicting religious in-
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Sights, a third religious insight is needed to determine
whose insight is the correct insight. But this is to beg
the question whether this new, third insight itself is a
correct insight. Different religious leaders and follow-
ers have disagreed, often violently, on what was the true
Will of God and whose God was really in command. If all
of them considered themselves true believers, none can be
expected to accept the claim of others. But this means
that whether something is true or not depends upon faith,
i.e., whether you believe in it or not, and not on objec-
tively verifiable evidence.
<4) The authority of books . Mo Tzu also speaks of the
"three laws (san-fa
, £/%) u ^ 6 or "three criteria (san-piao .
-
)"57 of distinguishing truth from falsehood (ch'ing -
. Y which should read chen-we
i
. 7h ) , the right
from the wrong, and the benefits from the harm, without
specifying whether the tests of truth apply only to factual
assertions, or only to normative assertions, or to both.
Nevertheless, he may be interpreted as taking the position
that the three criteria are the tests of the objective va-
lidity of basic moral principles, including the basic moral
55
principles derived from religious insight.
One of these three criteria is "the books by the an-
cient kings."58 Mo Tzu repeatedly urges all parties to
verify (cheng,y*, ) their contentions by looking into the
books by the ancient sage-kings. 59 He implicitly assumes
that statements made in these books are sufficient to prove
or disprove a moral principle as objectively true. In fact
he even called these books the basic laws (hsien
. % ) , not
only in the sense that they are the basic laws of the land,
but also in the sense that they are the basic laws of moral
truth. 6°
These books, however, were written by men, and as long
as men are fallible, statements made in these books or any
other book could be mistaken. Even if the authors were the
wise, as Mo Tzu maintained, statements in their books can-
not be accepted as true unless they can be verified by in-
dependent criteria.
(5) The beneficial consequences "prove” that the prin-
ciple of universal love is true. Mo Tzu also maintains
that the net outcome produced by the practical application
of a basic moral principle is a test of its truth. Accord-
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ing to hi*, if the net outcome is "beneficial to the state
and the people," it is true; if not, false. It is one of
his major contentions that following the will of Heaven by
practicing universal love and desisting war has brought a-
bout, and will continue to bring about, "the good order un-
der law, the harmony of the myriad people, the wealth of
the nation, sufficient supply of material, and a state in
which all the people have warm clothes, hearty meals, con-
venience and tranquility without anxiety ." 61 This, he as-
serts, is not only "beneficial" to the state and the people,
but also to "Heaven" and spirits
.
62 And this is what God
wants for Himself and for the people* 6^
I do not accept such a pragmatic criterion of truth. If
desirable consequences produced by the practical application
of a norm were a valid test of its truth, then we would have
to accept as true, for example, superstitions employed by
many parents and rulers in primitive societies (and by some
parents in this scientific age too) to prevent pre-marital
sexual relations, which Mo Tzu considered undesirable, 6^ if
they produce the desirable consequences, as many of them did
in pre-modern societies. Superstitions, i.e., unfounded
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beliefs, however, cannot be true whatever consequences they
produce.
Analytically, "x has beneficial consequences" contains
an empirical assertion that x has the consequences speci-
fied in the context of the discussion, and a value judgment
that the consequences are "beneficial." The empirical as-
sertion is a hypothesis which may be either true or false.
Whether the same alleged consequences are "beneficial" or
not depends on each speaker's personal value system. Ac-
cording to value-noncognitivism, there is no objective cri-
terion by which one may decide whether the consequences are
ob
.
i ec tively beneficial* Thus, the same consequences re-
garded as beneficial by Mo Tzu may be regarded as harmful
by someone who believes that all men ought to pursue their
own interest regardless of the consequences to others.
I conclude, therefore, that Mo Tzu's religious insight
does not provide an objective criterion by which one may
determine the truth of fundamental principles of ethics in
general and of political ethics in particular.
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C> Based on Rational Insight: Chu Hsi (^4)
Chu Hsi (Chu Ylian-hui, 1130-1200) is generally consid-
ered to be the greatest synthesizer of Confucian philosophy
as a whole and the most prominent leader of the "philosophy
of principle (l£-hsueh,^)" or what is known as the ra-
txonalxstic school of Neo-Confucianism. According to Wing-
tsit chan, he "has had a greater impact on Chinese, Korean,
and Japanese thought than any other Confucianists" except
Confucius and Mencius. 65
As a leading Confucianist
,
his ethical principles were
basically the same as other Confucianists, including Mencius
and Wang Yang-ming whose ethical principles we have intro-
duced in the previous section. In brief, the principle of
humanity (jen, ^ ) is still the kingpin of his moral system.
He said ''humanity is the perfect virtue of the original mind"
and is the first of all goodness; righteousness, propriety,
and wisdom all come from it. "66 In other words, humanity is
not only one of the Five Constant Virtues (wu-ch 1 ang; ,
namely, humanity, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and
faithfulness) but also the foundation of all goodness.
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Like Mencius and Wang Yang-mi„g( chu Hsi maintains
that political authority should be given to the men who
have developed these virtues, and the chief function of
government ought to be to create and maintain an environ-
ment conducive to the fullest development of these virtues.
The most significant difference between Chu Hsi's phi-
losophy and that of other Confucianists lies not in his
basic moral principles, but in his metaethics and meta-
physics. In contrast to Mencius and Wang Yang-ming who
maintain that moral insight leads to the knowledge that the
principles of humanity and righteousness are objectively
true, Chu Hsi holds that the objective validity of these
same moral principles is apprehended by rational insight
after an "investigation of things (ko-wu
.
Two Senses of Li. As noted, Chu Hsi's philosophy is
known as the "philosophy of li." "What is right," he main-
tains, "is the li of Nature (t ' ien-li
. t? ) and what is
wrong is in violation of the li of Nature ." 67 The imme-
diate question which must be answered is: What is .li and
how it is known?
The first question may appear to be a simple one at
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first glance, but it is not, for Chu Hsi did not make a
careful and systematic effort to define what he meant by
U, which has been translated variously as 'law 1
,
'reason',
order or principle'. His conception of li appeared in
his commentaries on Confucian Classics, on the works of his
masters, and in his letters in reply to questions posed by
his friends, students, and critics (which have been col-
lected under various titles totalling more than fifteen
thousand pages).
According to Chu Hsi, "all things have li; li is not
outside of things or affairs."68
Between Heaven and earth, there are li and ch'i
(sfiLt material force, sometime translated as
ether)
.
JUL is the Tao Way) that is above
physical form (hsing-erh-shang .^/. ^ a
t
i.e.,
without physical form) and is the source from
which thing S#< are produced. Ch'i is the instru-
ment (ch^i,^ ) that is below physical form
(hsing-erh-hUa.^^-TT. i.e., with physical form),
and is the implement whereby things are produced.
Therefore, men and things at the time of their
creation must be endowed with this li to have
their nature, and they must be endowed with this
material force to have their physical form. While
the nature and physical form are not outside of
the single body, the distinction between Tao and
ch 1 i (/£^, instrument) is very clear and must not
be confused, 6 9
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Chu Hsi's idea of li and rh'-i
-i 0 -i
—
a c __ i s similar to Aristotel-
ian distinction of form and matter, a i s an incorporeal
yet objective constitutive element of any man or thing. Li,
however, also means a true moral principle or the totality
oi true normative principles which ought to govern certain
kinds of human action. He argues, for example.
Before a thing exists, there is first its li. For
example, before there is any ruler and minister,
there exists already the li of the ruler and the
minister; before there is any father and son
there exists already the li of the father and the
son. It is not that originally there was no such
li and that it is only after there were ruler and
minister, father and son that tao-li (-</
,
Way
and principle, i.e., moral principle) was put in-
to them. 7^
It must be clear by now that Chu Hsi uses li in two
different senses without making any distinction! (1) *Li'
designates the objective principles or laws governing the
existence and activities of men and things. It may be
called wu-li or principles of things (which is also
the Chinese equivalent for 'physics'). (2) 'Li' is an eth-
ical principle that ought to govern human actions, human
relations, and the relations between men and nature.
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This double meaning of li has its origin in the lin-
guistic ambiguity of the Chinese language. U in chinese
means, in addition to principle, reason, tao or way, nature,
proper, pattern, and right, among other usages. Li i„ com-
bination with other Chinese characters form such important
terms as physics (v^l literally the principles of
things), rationality (li-h'sing, a combination of li
and nature, rational nature), idea or ideal (ir-hsianr *&#>
thinking based on principle or reason)
,
moral principle (1-
right reason or righteous principle, or tao-l^jg {$,
which combines way and principle to mean literally the prin-
ciple of Way or Tao), Principle of Nature (t'ien-ir
. ^ fg,
also means Principle of Heaven, i.e., Law of Nature) and
truth (chen-li
, Jf true or genuine principle). A term so
central to his philosophy and yet so ambiguous in ints mean-
ing can only add confusion to a theory which is not known
for clarity. With explanation and qualification, 'principle'
seems to be the closest English equivalent for 1^, as used
by Chu Hsi and other Neo-Confucianists.
The question is how such a principle is known, and
whether or not Chu Hsi has successfully demonstrated that
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what is prescribed by U can be shown to be objectively
true.
Necessary and Sufficient ConH,> ions o£ KntwW ,, Ac .
cording to Chu Hsi, to know li in both descriptive and pre-
scriptive senses one must fulfil two conditions: (1) He must
eliminate various obstructions from his mind so that the
mind will be in the position to know li. (2) He must engage
in what he called "the investigation of things. 1 ’
jfarifNation of mind as a necessary condition to
knowj^. Chu Hsi maintains that all men are endowed with
reason (1 i,rj? or li-hsing
. Vjt) and "wisdom" (chih.
,
intellective faculty) which, according to him, is "that by
which the principles of right and wrong are known."72 Al-
though all men have the natural endowments to know li, they
are not therefore necessarily conscious or fully conscious
of the empirical as well as moral principles of things, just
like the possession of eyes does not entail automatic and
clear vision of visible objects. Human minds, like human
eyes, may be obscured by various obstructions.
The main obstructions of the mind are emotions and ma-
terial or selfish desires. 73 Most of these may be put under
64
the general heading of "human desires,” which, according to
Chu Hsi, "need not involve indulgence in music, sex, mate-
rial things and profit, or extravagence in dwelling, sight-
seeing and travel; a slight failure of what is in the mind
to maintain what is right constitutes human desires. "74
To eliminate these obstructions, Chu Hsi prescribes a
process of purifying the mind through moral cultivation of
seriousness, sincerity, single-minded concentration, and
above all, "the investigation of things ." 75 When this is
done, then the mind will be in a position to know the prin-
ciples in things, for "the mind is like a mirror. If there
is no obstruction of dust, then the original substance [of
the mind] will naturally become clear (tzu-ming
. £>/£)) and
will be able to reflect things that come to it ." 76 Chu
Hsi's claim is not limited to the mind's ability to accu-
rately "reflect" visible phenomena, as the following exam-
ple may suggest, but extended to include its ability to "see"
clearly what is right and wrong, in a manner that seems to
bear a striking resembrance to the Thomistic "light or rea-
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once the mind is brilliantly luminous then irwtll agayUy.se, (tb-lanch^??"
3
feSgJ)
hafth^yi^g^aSlSLPdrlhCiPle H“«*' «**
. i _
. | .
P 0 nuee , ow could one derivbHat s mind is brilli fl-nt"! -ir i . ^
declared forthwith "ntht"
ly lumlnous when he
who had donP
1
5
h
.
t upon seelng another mane right, and knew forthwith that it wasong upon seeing another man who had done wrong. 78
Chu Hsi even claims that certain moral principles will
become "self-evident" to the mind when it is purified. He
declares,
As long as one follows the Principle of Nature
without an iota 01 selfish idea, certain moral
principles^ aw-Xl.rifrg#) will then become self-
evident (tzu-ming. & qa )* They are not artifi-
cially made up by man; they are so by nature. 79
(2) .Investigation of things" as a necessary condition
to
,
know li
. Chu Hsi's theory on the purification of mind
must not be considered in isolation from another necessary
condition of knowing true moral principles, namely "the in-
vestigation oj- things o Unlike Lao Tzu and Wang Yang-ming
who claim that the moral sense or the innate knowledge alone
is sufficient to apprehend the true moral principles, Chu
Hsi does not claim that reason alone is sufficient to ap-
prehend these moral principles. The true moral principles
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can be apprehended by reason only through investigating
concrete things. This is explicitly stated in his commen
tary on the Great Learning, a Confucian classic which he
helped to make a required text in Chinese education from
fourteenth to the twentieth century!
The meaning of the expression "The perfection
of knowledge
^
depends upon the investigation of
things (ko-wu,^^) 11 is this: If we wigh tQ
extend our knowledge to the utmost, we must ap -
proach things and exhaust (ch'iung
.
,
i 0 e.,
to investigate thoroughly) their principles. For
the intelligence of the human mind (jen-hsin chih
) has, without exception, the ability
to know, and all things in the world without ex-
ception have their principles
. It is only because
these principles are not yet exhausted that man's
knowledge is incomplete. For this reason, the
first step in the education of the adult is to
instruct the learner to approach all things in
the world on the basis of the principles he al-
ready knows, and investigate further so that he
may reach the ultimate. After he has exerted
himself in this way for a long time, he will one
day suddenly achieve a penetrating understanding
(huo-jan kuan-t'ung .^^-ffjj). Then none of the
exterior and interior , the essence and the coarse
parts of the multitude of things will remain un-
reached, and the total substance and the great
functioning of the mind will be perfectly lumi-
nous (ming
. ££ . clear and intelligence)* This is
called "things investigated" (wu-ko . the
investigation of things has been done) ; this is
called the perfection of knowledge. 80
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The significance of this passage in Chu Hsi's meta-
ethics is best summarized by himself in his concluding re-
mark: It "contains the essence of comprehending goodness ." 81
Three questions
. For the purposes of this inquiry, we
need to take up three basic questions,
(i) Chu Hsi contends that purification of mind is anal-
ogous to removing dust from the eyes and mirrors, or re-
moving foreign matter from the water, which, like the mind,
is said to be pure by nature
.
82 These analogies are mis-
leading. For, while it is possible to objectively deter-
mine what constitutes the "dust" in the eyes or on the mir-
ror and the "foreign matter" in the water, there is no ob-
jective criterion to determine what constitutes the "dust"
or the "foreign matter" of the mind. The "dust" and the
foreign matter" of the mind refer of course not to physi-
cal matter but to "alien," "unnatural," "improper ," "cor-
rupting" or "harmful" ideas, all of which amount to morally
wrong ideas. In Chu Hsi's terminology, these morally wrong
ideas are "human desires,” This is unequivocally stated in
his contention that "a slight failure of what is in the mind
to maintain what is right constitutes human desires,” as
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quoted earlier. Since men differ in their views on what is
wight, purification of mind, i.e.
,
the removal of "human
desires," means the removal of different ideas to men of
different moral persuasion. It is therefore impossible to
objectively determine whether a man has met Chu Hsi's first
necessary condition to know the true moral principles.
(ii) More basic to Chu Hsi's central contention is the
question whether it is possible to gain objective moral
knowledge by what he misleadingly called "the investiga-
tion of things. What he means by "the investigation of
things" is not an empirical investigation, as the term
seems to suggest. He means the apprehension by the "intel-
ligence of the human mind of empirical and moral principles,
which, according to him, are "above physical form" and exist
within things, by approaching these things, as distinct from
Lao Tzu's method of sitting in one's own study to apprehend
Tao "without looking" or the method of the "rectification
of mind" advocated by the idealistic school of Confucianists
or meditation advocated by the Buddhist. 33 While the jLi to
be investigated, or more accurately, to be "penetrated" in-
clude empirical principles in some cases, Chu Hsi's primary
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emphasis is on the "penetrating understanding" of "the right
and wrong of human affairs" or "the li of what ought to be"
within every thing and every human affair.
Obviously, these moral principles cannot be derived
from an objective investigation of things. I agree with
Liang Ch'i-ch'ao's criticism of Chu Hsi's theory on "the in-
vestigation of things that an objective investigation of
things can only yield the [empirical] principles of things
(wi-1%,^-^) in the natural world; nothing relating to
good and evil and other valuational issues can come out
from such an investigation. 85 (Chu Hsi's contention must be
ate^ from the simple form of naturalism which
holds that normative principles of politics can be derived
from descriptive generalizations. See Chap. Ill, B, i-iii.)
(iii) But what if moral contestants, who claim to have
fulfilled Chu Hsi's necessary and sufficient conditions,
apprehended by their "wisdom" (reason) conflicting moral
principles to be true moral principles? Chu Hsi falls back
on the theory of self-evidence as the last recourse.
Self-evidence ( tzu-ming
.S *>£>) in Chinese literally
means "naturally" clear without proof or argument. The
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character "evidence" or "clem-" •? * -par is formed by combining the
character "sun" and the character "moon." It suggests that
something is unquestionably clear, as if it were under the
sun and the moon.
Chu Hsi, however, fails to distinguish between self-
evidence in the logical and the psychological sense. A
statement is logically self-evident if its denial results
in self-contradiction. Such a proposition is analytic, i.e.,
the predicate is contained in the subject. Chu Hsi did not
explicitly employ this type of argument.
Psychological self-evidence means that the denial of
a normative principle is inconceivable by anyone in a given
period of time. It is difficult to imagine any basic moral
principles to be psychologically self-evident, for the very
fact that they are discussed or defended implies the absence
of total agreement. There were too many Taoists, Moists,
Buddhists and other non-Confucianists in Chu Hsi's day to
prevent him from making a claim of self-evidence in this
sense. Even if he did, it does not prove that such a moral
principle is true. A statement is not made true by the fact
that someone claims that it is true or by the fact that it
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is accepted as self-evidence.
Chu Hsi's version of self-evidence is a much more
moderate one. In the absence of an established term, his
version of: self-evident principle may be called a condi-
tional self-evident principle. It is conditional because
he claims that the moral principles he has enumerated will
become self-evident to those, and only to those, who have
fulfilled the necessary and sufficient conditions to know
—* In theory, these moral principles can be self-evident
to all, if they fulfill the necessary and sufficient con-
ditions, which, in his view, all men are capable of doing,
even though they may not actually do so.
According to Chu Hsi, all men have in themselves his
basic moral principles. How do we know? “The most relia-
ble evidence," he maintains, "is to be found in the source
of their manifestation ." 86 He asserts that
from the feeling of compassion, we necessarily
k110
^
(pl-chih .A^ that there is humanity [in
man's nature]; from the feeling of shame and dis-
like, we necessarily know that there is justice
[in man's nature]; from the feeling of humility
and reverence, we necessarily know that there is
propriety [in man's nature]; and from the feeling
of right and wrong, we necessarily know that there
is wisdom [in man's nature]. If originally there
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were no [moral] principles within man, how can
®ucb *nan1
-£estations without ? From what is
th»^K
ted Wlth
?
Ut
»
We theref°re necessarily knowthat there are [moral 1 principlesWithin man.inis cannot be false ,87
Taken together with his repeated assertion that these
moral principles will become self-evident to those who have
fulfilled the necessary and sufficient conditions mentioned
earlier, it is possible to interpret the expression ’’neces-
sarily know” in the passage to mean that the four moral
principles are self-evident to all of them. It is not
clear, however, whether it must be taken to mean that it is
self-evident in the psychological sense or in the logical
sense. If Chu Hsi means the former, we need only point out
that the "feeling of compassion,” for example, has been
claimed to be an acquired or learned feeling and not part
of human nature, or an extension of self-love and not an ex-
pression of benevolence. Instead of being an expression of a
true moral principle, Lao Tzu considered the feeling of com-
passion a sympton of the degeneration from the Tao, that is,
the true moral principle. These and similar arguments are
some of the standing refutations of the contention that
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these moral principles are self-evident in the psychological
sense.
How does Chu Hsi respond to those who intuited non-Con-
fucian moral principles? Here is an example:
here is still a kind of people who proclaim that
their minds are brilliantly luminous, but [accord-mg to Chu Hsi] have never illuminated and seen
various affairs and things. Brilliant luminosity
like this provides no help to the problems in this
world. Nowadays the Buddhists proclaim that their
minds are brilliantly luminous and yet, with re-
gard to the rather and the son, they do not know
what is called affection (ch 1 ) ; and, with
regard to the ruler and the minister, they know
not what is called justice. To say that this is
brilliant luminosity is to confuse the Tao (Way)
.
Such a proclamation, of course, is not a demonstration
or proor. The Buddhists could, and indeed did, charge that
Chu Hsi simply could not "see 11 the true moral principles
because he had not overcome his carnal desires. Chu Hsi
draws an analogy between the Buddhist position and those who
make the claim that a river was empty without even trying to
dip their hands into water to “see" (t l an-k l an .^^)whether
their hands were cold and wet.°9 Chu Hsi's criticism would
have been justified, if the problem were one of determining
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whether there was water in the river, and if so, whether
the water was warm or cold. The question, however, was
about what he called "the true moral principles ."90 And
there is no moral water into which moral philosophers can
dip their raetaethical hands.
Chu Hsi, however, is correct in one sense when he as-
serts that we "necessarily know" that there are humanity,
justice, propriety, and wisdom in man's nature. This con
elusion follows necessarily not from self-evident prin-
ciples nor from the observable manifestations of human na-
ture which he described variously as the clue (tuan.
,
or literally the tip of a thing) of man's original
substance (pen-t ' ¥.3^ or the physical form materialized
from "the principle of man's nature (hsing-chih-li i*£)
but from certain descriptive generalizations in combination
with the following definitions! 'humanity* means the same
as 'the hsin (/O
,
"heart" which for Chu Hsi means also
"feeling") of compassion'; 'justice* is synonymous with 'the
hsin of shame and dislike'; 'propriety' is defined as 'the
hsin of humility and reverence' ; 'wisdom' is defined to mean
the same as 'the hsin of right and wrong'. It must be
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pointed out here that Chu Hsi is understood by many stu-
dents of Chinese philosophy to maintain the above defini-
tions, even though he did not explicitly say so in his
writings, 91 The literary style of Chinese philosophers in
the last two thousand years worked against this type of
expression, A typical definition in Chu Hsi's writings and
most philosophical works in Chinese takes the following
form: "The heart of compassion [pause] humanity. 11 The
pause (where a correct English sentence requires a verb but
a Chinese sentence of a good literary style does not) is
understood variously to mean 'is' or 'means' or 'implies'.
Thus, our sample sentence is translated by Wing-tsit Chan
as "The feeling of commiseration is what we called human-
ity ; by Derk Bodde as "The feeling of commiseration is
human-heartedness"; and by James Legge as "The feeling of
commiseration implies the principle of benevolence."92 The
rirst translation makes the sentence a definition, the sec-
ond a value-judgment
,
and the third a questionable asser-
tion of a rather ambiguous logical relationship.
Given these definitions and given the fact that men do
have these feelings in the relevant situations, Chu Hsi's
76
conclusion is "necessary" in the sense that the conclusion
cannot be logically otherwise. But the conclusion is "nec-
essary" by definition. A different conclusion will neces-
sarily follow from a different definition. For example,
given the definition that
'faintheartedness' means the same
as 'the hsin of compassion' or 'the hsin that cannot bear
to see the sufferings of others' and given the fact that men
do have these feelings in the relevant situations, then we
"necessarily know" that there is 'faintheartedness' (not hu-
inanity) in man's nature.
Chu Hsi attempts to show by his conclusion that it is
objectively right for men to cultivate the "hearts" or feel-
ings specified and to practice the principles of humanity,
justice, propriety, and wisdom. The conclusion derived
from the other definition has an unfavorable connotation.
It suggests that the "heart" or feeling specified should
not be cultivated. Logically, Chu Hsi's conclusion does
not prescribe that men ought to do one thing rather than
another » If the terms 'humanity' and faintheartedness'
seems to have the prescriptive force of a moral directive,
it is because they are value-words with favorable and un-
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favorable connotations respectively. Both of them refer
to the same feeling of compassion. The only difference
between the two is a verbal difference, that is, a differ-
ence in word rather than in content. Neither term adds any
factual information to the descriptive generalization that
men are capable of such feeling. The speaker selects ei-
ther ’humanity 1 or
-faintheartedness 1 to express his ap-
proval or disapproval of the feeling and attempts to influ-
ence his listener to adopt similar attitudes by means of
these expressions. This, however, is to advocate a certain
moral principle by a definitional fiat, which is analytic,
empty, and arbitrary.
To obtain the prescriptive force of a moral directive,
Chu Hsi must prove that the feelings specified or by defi-
nition 'humanity*, * justice*
,
'propriety* and 'wisdom' are
objectively good or right. Chu Hsi has not proved that they
are objectively good or right. They cannot be proved to be
objectively good or right because whether they are good or
right is a matter of subjective moral judgment. For example,
one may affirm that all men have a feeling of compassion in
a certain situation and advocate, without self-contradic-
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tion, that all parents ought to harden the hearts of their
children, either as a means to survival
in this world of relentless competition
or success in life
and national or
class hostility. In fact, a feeling of compassion toward
a certain kind of people has been condemned as a "wrong"
feeling. It is well-known that during the relatively short
history of human civilization, countless numbers of those
who have had a feeling of compassion for the "enemy" or
even merely the "innocent" children of the "enemy" of vari-
ous political, religious, and moral doctrines have been
condemned (many to death) by the "true believers" for hav-
ing such a "misguided, wrong" feeling of compassion.
To sum up, like many rationalists in the West, Chu
Hsi maintains that reason is the "substance" from which all
things derive their being and the underlying "principle"
that determines the nature of all things. It is the giver
of the descriptive as well as moral "laws" of the universe.
Keason is also the faculty of intuition by means of which
men apprehend the "substance," the "principle," and the de-
scriptive as well as moral "laws." All of this is a sheer
speculation. Chu Hsi's rational insight has not proved
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that there are objective moral principles in men and things
and that his basic principles of political ethics are ob
jectively true.
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CHAPTER hi
NATURALISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL ETHICS
The metaethical theory of naturalism agrees with intu-
itxonism that certain basic moral principles can be known
to be objectively true, but denies that they can be known
to be true by the alleged moral or religious or rational
insight o Naturalism in general holds that ethical state-
ments are, or can somehow be reduced to, true descriptive
statements and can, therefore, be shown to be true or false
in the way ordinary factual statements can»
According to one version of naturalism, ethical judg-
ments follow from factual statements (such as the nature or
relations of things) 0 In contrast to this version of natu-
ralism, a more sophisticated form of naturalism holds that
normative principles can be derived, not from factual state-
ments alone, but from a descriptive definition of some basic
ethical terms together with a descriptive generalization.
This form of naturalism is known as the definist theory.
Like intuitionism, it holds that ethical terms stand for
some objective properties, but interprets them as standing
for '’natural 1 ' properties. If basic ethical terms can be
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adequately defined in descriptive terms (e.g.
,
-good' means
the same as 'happiness 1 ) , then the truth of an ethical
statement can in principle be verified by empirical method.
A> Based on Descriptive Definitions of Value TWmo -
Hslin Tzu (/$) )
Among the major Chinese philosophers concerned with
politics, Hslin Tzu (c. 313-238 B.C.)
,
the founder of the
naturalistic school of Confucianism, is the only thinker
who explicitly uses definist arguments. He maintains,
All men in the world, past and present, have
meant by 'good' uprightness, civility, peace
[and] order (cheng 1? p'ing chlh.^ff^a and
by evil partiality, meliciousness, violence
[and] disorder (p'ien hsien p'ei luanA&&S&S.
This is the difference between good and evil.l
The above definition of ‘good’ and 'evil' in the Chi-
nese text may be given several interpretations. For ex-
ample, Wing-tsit Chan translates them as "true principles
and peaceful order" and "imbalance, violence, and disorder"
respectively Burton Watson renders the definition of
'good' as "that which is upright, reasonable, and orderly"
82
and 'evil' as "that which is prejudiced, irresponsible, and
chaotic o'^
Regardless of which interpretation one eventually de-
cides to take, HsUn Tzu’s defining characteristics of ’good’
and ’evil 1 contain both evaluative and descriptive terms,
for example, the word ’uprightness’ in the definition does
not refer to a physical posture; it refers to the moral
correctness oi an action. In the context of his Confucian
philosophy, "uprightness and civility" might refer to cour-
tesy, humility, loyalty, faithfulness, propriety, or right-
eousness. "Partiality and maliciousness" might refer rough-
ly to the contrary of uprightness and civility. For exam-
ple, injuring or robbing the weak by the strong is regarded
by HsUn Tzu as violating the principles of uprightness and
civility, and according to his definition evil. 4 Similarly,
doing violence to or shouting down the few by the many is
regarded by him as violating the same principles and accord-
ing to his definition objectively evil. 5 But these are
moral judgments with which non-Confucianists often disagree.
Unless the properties, in virtue of which an action or a
state of affairs is said to be good or evil, are stated in
83
descriptive terms, a definition of 'good' and ’evil' cannot
be considered a naturalistic definition.
In HsUn Tzu's political philosophy,
'good' means pri-
marily "peace and order" and 'evil' means primarily "vio-
lence and disorder." This is a definition in descriptive
terms. In this sense, HsUn Tzu's definition is naturalistic.
Given this definition and given the descriptive generaliza-
tion that certain things, actions, or states of affairs are
conducive to "peace and order" or "violence and disorder,"
it is logical to conclude that the things, actions, or states
of affairs specified are good or evil.
A substantial proportion of HsUn Tzu's writings is de-
voted to the kind of descriptive generalizations just men-
tioned. he maintains that, in order to survive, men must
live in a society. But M a society without the rules of so-
cial distinction will lead to contention. Where there is
contention, there will be disorder ." 6 Why? Because "men
are born with desires. If these desires are not satisfied,
they cannot but seek some means to satisfy themselves. If
there are no limits to their seeking, there will inevitably
be war (cheng
.
jj? ). Where there is war, there will be dis-
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order. "7 Like Thomas Hobbes (1583-1679), HsUn Tzu maintains
that similarities of human desires and the scarcity of the
supply of things desired by various classes of people in a
society cause war and disorder, in the absence of adequate
political authority and appropriate rules of social distinc-
tion. In Hslin Tzu's words, a society is a place in which
different classes of people live together and
seek the same things by different methods. They
have the same desires but different degree of
knowledge.... Both the wise and the stupid have
the things they approved of. But what they ap-
proved of are not the same, and here the wise
and the stupid differ.... People desire and hate
the same things. Their desires are many, but
things are few. The scarcity of things inevi-
tably leads to war (cheng,
,
struggle).
8
They differ, however, as to the means by which politi-
cal order can be established. Hobbes maintains that the
conclusion of a social contract, in which all men in a giv-
en geographical location mutually agree to give up all but
the most basic rights (e.g., the right of self-defense) and
to submit to whatever positive laws the newly-established
sovereign might enact, is the only rational way out of the
state of nature which is a state of war of all against all.
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HsUn Tzu holds that only the strongest, wisest, and the
most discriminating men can extricate the people (presum-
ably most of them, if not all) from violence and disorder
which, according to his definition, are what "all men" have
meant by 'evil' and bring about peace and order which are
what "all men" have meant by 'good'. HsUn Tzu concludes
that "therefore, only these men should become the Son of
Heaven ," 9 that is, the ruler of a society. These strongest,
wisest, and most discriminating men are known as the sages
in Hslln Tzu' s philosophy. According to him, they are the
men who have "complete mastery of the moral principles of
human relationships ," 10 and the men who have created the
rules of proper conduct (li,ff ) and the standards of jus-
tice ) which are indispensable means to the survival
of man and the peace and tranquility of a society
.
11
For the purposes of this analysis, the main question
is: Is it adequate to define the value terms 'good' and
'evil' by the descriptive terms 'peace and order' and 'vio-
lence and disorder' respectively? If this definition were
adequate, it would be self-contradictory to maintain that
something which is not conducive to peace and order is good,
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or that something which is is evil. It cannot be denied,
however, that there are people who have meant by good or
evil something other than the properties specified by Hslin
Tzu's definition. Hedonists, for example, have maintained
that 'good' means pleasure or happiness. It is also possi-
ble to affirm that something has one of the properties Hslin
Tzu defined as 'good' and deny, without self-contradiction,
that it is good. For example, a revolutionary who denies
peace is desirable in a society he works to overthrow
is not contradicting himself.
The Doctrine of the nRectification of Names .” Hslin Tzu
has an additional argument for his naturalistic definition,
namely the doctrine known as the "rectification of names
(cheng-ming . jf % )." This well-established literal trans-
lation designates a Confucian theory dealing with such di-
verse problems as the origin, function, meaning, logical
principles and proper uses of Chinese language. To avoid
unnecessary confusion created by the term 'name 1 and to fo-
cus attention on the immediate issue, I shall use 'rectifi-
cation of definitions' to designate Hslin Tzu's theory of
correct definition.
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The word cheng in the rectification of definitions
literally means 'correct' or 'right' as a noun and 'to set
aright’ or 'to set straight' as a verb. The very concept
of the rectification of definitions implies a claim that
there are correct definitions and, hence, that incorrect
definitions can be "rectified."
What then are the criteria of correct definitions?
Hslln Tzu maintains that whether the meaning of a word is
correct or not is to be determined by whether it has the
sanction of convention, or, in the absence of a convention,
the sanction of a true king. He asserts.
words (ming
, ^ , literally means 'names*) have no
inherent correctness. The correctness is given
by convention (ytleh .^f,
,
agreement). When the
convention is established and the custom is formed,
they are called correct words. Those words which
are contrary to the convention are called incor-
rect words. Words have no inherent corresponding
substance (shih
. )» The substantive meanings
attached to words are given by convention. When
the convention is established and the custom form-
ed, they are called words with substantive mean-
ings (shih-ming
.^y 4 ) • There are words which are
inherently good. Words which are direct, easy to
understand, and consistent are called good words. 12
It is clear from this statement that Hslln Tzu recog
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nized the arbitrariness of stipulate definitions, at
least at the initial stage when an expression is first in-
troduced. There is no inherent contradiction in naming
for example, what we called ‘small' today by the symbol
large', or 'right' by the symbol 'wrong', or 'good' by
the symbol 'evil', although a symbol too similar to others
(hence, making it difficult to differentiate it from others)
or a symbol that will take hours to write cannot be called
a "good word 1 ' in the sense that it is not very practical.
Nor is there any inherent contradiction in attaching sub-
stantive meaning (in the sense of denoting substances or
natural properties) such as "peace and order" or pleasure
to the word 'good', and "violence and disorder" or pain to
the word 'evil'. Hslln Tzu maintains, however, that once a
word with a specific meaning becomes a usage sanctioned by
convention, it becomes a "correct" definition. To Hslln Tzu,
convention is a criterion of what constitutes a correct def-
inition.
Now, if value terms such as 'good' and 'evil' have no
inherent meanings, as Hslln Tzu correctly maintained, then
the definition that "good means peace and order" must be
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taken as an author's own proposal as to how he wants to use
the word 'good'. As such, even if everyone in a given so-
ciety (or in the world) came to accept the definition, the
definition itself still cannot be said to be either correct
or incorrect. HsUn Tzu's definition of good and evil, how-
ever, has never attained the status of a universal conven-
tion (either within a given society or the world as a whole)
during any given period of time. As we have shown, natu-
ralists disagree among themselves as to the meaning of good.
The time of HsUn Tzu, according to his own account,
was a time in which "the sage-kings have passed away, the
observance of [established] definitions have become lax,
strange terms have arisen, words and their substantive mean-
ings have been confu6ed, and the distinction between right
and wrong has become unclear ,nl3 He was not prepared to
wait passively for the state of affairs to take its own
course and accept whatever convention might eventually
emerge. He therefore introduced, without explicitly saying
so, a new criterion of correct definitions, namely, the def-
initions sanctioned by a true king. In his words,
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ShotLU a [true] king appear, he would certainly
°ld
r7?
rd
^
and c^te new ones. This being
c se, l ] the reasons for having words, [2]the causes for the similarities and differences
xn words, and [3] the fundamental principUs ofinstituting words, must be carefully examined. 14
The language of this passage does not specifically
point out that the meanings of ethical terms sanctioned by
a true king should be accepted as the correct meanings.
But the laudatory term "[true] king," his purpose of exam-
ining these three problems in the chapter entitled "Recti-
fication of Names," and the ensuing discussions on these
problems leave no doubt that the meanings sanctioned by a
true king should be accepted as the correct meanings, espe-
cially if they were instituted according to the principles
he laid down in the chapter entitled "Rectification of
Names. It is difficult to see how the approval (or disap-
proval) of a true king can change in any way the logical
status of Hslin Tzu's definition of good and evil which, as
we have shown, is not very fruitful.
I conclude therefore that Hslin Tzu has not demonstrated
that his naturalistic definition of good and evil is an ad-
equate definition.
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B
’ £ased on Empirical RoneraHgaMnn,
In addition to the definist theory we have discussed,
there is another type of naturalism which holds that moral
principles can be derived from descriptive generalizations
without the assistance of a descriptive definition of ethi-
cal terms. This type of naturalism became a dominant
school of metaethics in China in the early twentieth cen-
tury when the new elite of Chinese intellectuals embraced
enthusiastically the "scientific method” imported from the
West# This school of political thinkers claim explicitly
that their political doctrines are true because they are
derived from the
_scientific laws of human evolution or of
history. The belief that normative principles can be de-
rived from empirical generalizations, however, has a long
history in Chinese political philosophy. Part of Mencius'
metaethics represents this type of naturalism in the tradi-
tional period. The political philosophies of Sun Yat-sen
and Mao Tse-tung provide its modern versions.
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i. Mencius
Unique Nature of Man and Moral Prinripi.e In contrast
to HsUn Tzu who defines ’human nature' as what is given at
the time of birth and cannot be learned or acquired by ef-
fort, Mencius means by ’human nature' (hsing .fg ) the inborn
nature which makes a creature a man and distinguishes him
ir°m a11 other animals. According to Mencius, "that where-
by man differs from animals (ch* in-shou.^ jSV literally
the birds and beasts) is slight," but of great importance
.
15
These unique inborn characteristics of man are "the heart
of compassion," "the heart of shame and dislike," "the heart
of humility and reverence," and "the heart of right and
wrong ." 16 He maintains that all men "inherently possess" a
heart with the aforementioned dispositions; "they are not
gilded onto them from without ." 17 The following case is
said to illustrate that "all men have a heart which cannot
bear to see the sufferings of others," that is, all men have
a heart of compassion:
When men suddenly see a child about to fall into
a well, they all have a feeling of alarm and sym-
pathy, not because they want to gain friendship
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with the child s parents, nor because they seekthe praise of their neighbors and friends, norbecause they disiike the reputation [of inhuman!-ty if they did not rescue the child], 18
From the premise that the specified psychological dis-
positions are the characteristics which set man apart from
all other animals, Mencius concludes that n a man without
the heart of compassion is not a man, a man without the
heart of shame and dislike is not a man, a man without the
heart of humility and reverence is not a man, and a man
without the heart of right and wrong is not a man. "19
cordingly
,
he declares that Yang Chu and Mo Tzu are animals,
because
Yang advocates each man for himself; this is king-
less (wu-chlin .M &
,
i.e., the denial of alle-
giance due to the king) 0 Mo advocates universal
love; this is fatherless (wu-fu . afr 6 . i.e., the
denial of special affection due to the father)
.
He who is fatherless or kingless is an animal
(ch* in- shou
.^ . birds and beasts). 20
Obviously, Mencius cannot be interpreted to mean by the
above conclusion that a man cannot be called a man in the
biological sense of the word if he does not possess the psy-
chological dispositions he has specified. What he means by
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the above conclusion is that a man who fails to preserve and
develop his unique inborn nature of man is morally bad. To
Mencius, the fact that these psychological dispositions are
the characteristics which distinguish a good man from a bad
man and animals entails that these dispositions ought to be
preserved and developed. Consequently, judgments about the
moral rectitude of actions become judgments about whether or
not they are in harmony with the unique nature of man, and
judgments about the morality of political institutions and
public policies become judgments about whether they are con-
ducive to the development of the unique nature of man.
Objections to Mencius* Naturalism * Mencius' arguments
must be criticized on three levels: The adequacy of his
definition or 'human nature', the validity of his assertion
of man's unique inborn characteristics, and the possibility
of deducing normative principles from factual premises.
First, to ask the question "What is the nature of man?"
is to ask what are the specifically human characteristics.
A valid answer to the question must provide a descriptive
generalization of the characteristics which distinguish the
creature called "man" from other animals. The nature of man
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therefore consists of those propertyi-u erties whose presence would
prompt men of different moral persuasions to use the term
"man" to refer to the creature, and whose absence would stop
them from doing so. To answer the question by saying that a
man is a creature with the psychological dispositions he
specified is certainly not an adequate answer. For even if
the answer were to be limited to the area of human disposi-
tions, they are not limited to those mentioned by Mencius.
1’he Lr Chi (-ff^g. Book of Rites, a Confucian classic), for
example, lists seven inborn dispositions!
What are human feelings? They are the seven which
men are capable of without learning
: joy, anger
sorrow, rear, love, dislike, and desires.
... Man's
great desires lie in drinking eating, and [rela-
tions between] man and woman. 21
If these dispositions are inborn, as many psychologists
seem to agree, then it is arbitrary to exclude them from the
definition of human nature. It is one thing to call a crea-
ture a man because he possesses certain characteristics which
are the common features of a species, and quite another to
say that certain dispositions are good dispositions which
make a man a true man. The former is a factual assertion and
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the latter is a value judgment. Mencius seems to have con-
fused the factual question "What makes a creature a man?"
with the moral question "What characteristics make a man a
£ood man?" The term 'human nature' becomes a valuational
term masquerading as a descriptive one when it is used ex-
clusively to designate what the author himself believed to
be the characteristics of a good man.
Second, it is questionable that the psychological dis-
positions specified by Mencius are unique to man and inborn
in them. It is a well-known fact that non-human primates,
elephants, and tigers have shown a remarkable natural dis-
position to love their own babies. If this can be taken as
an expression of compassion, then the "heart of compassion"
is not a unique human trait. The dispositions to feel shame
and dislike, humility and reverence, and right and wrong ap-
pear to be unique to the human species. But studies on var-
ious primitive societies indicate that these dispositions
are not inborn; they are acquired dispositions which men
learn from 'moral education" both at home and in school, and
from their social existence.
Finally, it is impossible to deduce moral and valuation-
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al PrinclPle s from factual premises. Valid logical deduc-
tion simply makes explicit what is implicitly contained in
the premises. Consequently, it is logically impossible to
deduce from a factual premise or a set of factual premises
which does not contain what ought to be done a conclusion
which does. Thus even if the factual assertion that all men
have a heart of compassion were true, it does not entail that
the heart of compassion ought to be preserved and developed,
let alone that a specific kind of compassion (e.g., the kind
advocated by Mencius and not the kind advocated by Mo Tzu)
ought to be developed. Indeed, it is not self-contradictory
to affirm that all men have a heart of compassion and advo-
cate that, for their own good or for their nation or for the
human race as a whole, they ought to toughen their hearts to
face all kinds of challenge in this world. This criticism
applies also to his naturalistic arguments for the cultiva-
tion of other allegedly unique inborn dispositions of man.
ii. Sun Yat-sen {
In contrast to Mencius' attempt to derive normative
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principles of politics from "human nature," modern chinese
naturalists, who embraced enthusiastically empiricism and
some form of historicism of the West, attempt to derive
basic principles of political ethics from the law of histo-
ry. As modern examples of naturalism, I shall examine in
this and the following sections two most representative and
most influential naturalistic theories in the twentieth cen
tury China: the political philosophy of Sun Yat-sen and
that of Mao Tse-tung*
fhe basic political doctrines of Sun Yat-sen (1866-
1925), the founding father of the Republic of China, are
known as San Min Chu 1 or the Three Principles of the People.
In the simplest terms, these doctrines stipulate that the
Chinese ought to struggle for the survival of the Chinese
nation within an independent and '’democratic” nation-state
in which the people share in common all material things es-
sential to livelihood. According to Sun Yat-sen, these
basic moral principles of politics can be derived from the
law of history which can be scientifically verified.
People’s Struggle for Survival Is the Motive Force of
History
. According to Sun Yat-sen, history follows a defi-
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nite course. The course of history is determined by man's
struggle for survival which includes both spiritual and ma-
terial factors.
"People's struggle for survival, not mate-
rial forces, is the center of gravity in history. "22
i'he reason why all men from the antiquity to the
cause
n
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erted ability is simply be-ey desire to survive. And it is because01 mankind s struggle for uninterrupted survival
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the unceasinS evolution. There-
ore, the law of social evolution is mankind's
struggle for survival. Mankind's struggle for
survival is the cause of social evolution. 23
Men's struggle for survival, however, does not imply
that there are irreconcilable or inevitable conflicts be-
tween different classes of men. Sun Yat-sen admits that in-
terests of different classes of people within a society do
come into conflict sometimes, but he maintains that irrec-
oncilable conflict and class war are not normal, but patho-
logical phenomena of social evolution. In his words,
Class war is not the cause of social evolution; it
is a disease developed in the course of social
evolution. The cause of the disease is man* s in-
ability to survive, and the result of the disease
is war. What Marx saw in his studies of social
problems was the diseases of social evolution; he
did not see the basic principle of social evolu-
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tiorio Therefore
pathologist; he
ogist.24
,
iiarx can only be called a social
cannot be called a social physiol-
Why? Because most people are intelligent enough to know
that in order to survive, they must live in a society, and
a society survives and "progresses through mutual adjust-
ments of major economic interests in the society rather than
through the clashes of these major economic interests."25 In
other words, a great majority is willing to cooperate and
adjust their relations with others because they know it is
to their mutual interest to do so. 26
The Principle of People* s Livelihood
. The Principle of
People's Livelihood (Min-sheng chS-i . /£,V h ig generally
considered as "the most fundamental principle" of Sun Yat-
sen's Three Principles of the People and "the philosophical
j-oundation of his political doctrines. 27 The fact that he
expounded his theory of history and outlined the ideal so-
ciety in his lectures on the Principle of People's Liveli-
hood seems to justify such an interpretation. The question
is. What does he mean by people's livelihood?" According
to Sun Yat-sen,
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S liVelih°°d) is the livelihood° m eople, e existence of society the wel-fare or the nation, and the life of the’masses.28
Clearly, the exact meaning of "people's livelihood" is
not enhanced by this definition. However, from his asser-
tion that "the problem of man' s struggle for survival is the
same thing as the problem of people's livelihood," 29 the
term "people's livelihood" may be interpreted to mean the
same as people's struggle for survival 0
Sun Yat-sen maintains that people's livelihood "is the
center o.l politics, the center of economics, and the center
of all historical movements.”30 From this descriptive gen-
eralization, he concludes that ”we must recognize people's
livelihood as the center of social history. And when we
have made a thorough investigation of the central problems
of people's livelihood, we shall have the solution of the
social problem."31 In other words, scientific investigation
can lead not only to the discovery of the laws of politics,
economics, and history, but also to the "solution” of social
problem.
According to Sun Yat-sen, equalization of land and
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governmental "regulation” of private capital are the scien-
tific solutions to, or the scientific "methods" to settle,
the social problem of people's livelihood in China.32 The
social problem of people's livelihood is completely solved
when a faithful implementation of these two "solutions" ush-
ers in a new period of communism (kung-ch'a* a4
,
literally
common ownership of property)
„
33 From this. Sun Yat-sen
concludes,
Therefore
. communism is the highest ideal of so-
cial reconstruction. The Principle of People's
Livelihood [which according to Sun Yat-sen, "is
communism,"] which the Kuomintang advocates is
not only the highest ideal, it is also the motive
force of society and the center of all historical
movements. 3
4
In fact. Sun Yat-sen went even further to claim that
"the true Principle of People's Livelihood," i.e., the state
in which the Principle of People's Livelihood has been car-
ried out, "is the World of Great Harmony (ta-t'ung shih-
chieh
. x Chinese equivalence of Utopia, an ideal popu-
larized by K'ang Yu-wei) which Confucius hoped for" and is
the state in which "people not only share in common proper-
ties but also all things and powers. "35
103
Sun Yat sen s scientific solutions to the social prob-
lem of people's livelihood have thus become the ideal so-
ciety which ought to be realized here in this world.
The Principles of Nationalism and Democracy
, sun Yat-
sen believes that nationalism and democracy are necessary
means to man's survival and to the realization of the ideal
society in the twentieth century. He argues that as long
as China is not independent, free from foreign control, free
from "alien" domination of the Manchu government, and free
from the ambition of powerful men who wanted to become the
emperor, it is not only impossible to realize the ideal so-
ciety, the very survival of the Chinese people is also
threatened.
Sun Yat- sen maintains that "nationalism is that pre-
cious thing which enables a state to develop and a nation
to perpetuate its existence. "36 B'or the rise and fall of a
nation is not determined merely by the "natural forces" but
by "a combination of natural and human forces.... Man-made
power may rival the work of nature and the work of man may
excel that of nature. Of those man-made forces, the most
potent are political and economic forces. They have a
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greater influence on the rise and fall of a nation than the
forces of nature. M37
He asserts that the political and economic oppressions
of foreign imperialism "have made it impossible for social
enterprises in China to develop and have deprived the com-
mon people in China of their opportunity to survive."38 He
declares.
In view of the law (ta°zii>i| *>J> , the way and prin-ciple^ national survival firom the past to thepresent, if we want to save China and to insurethe permanent existence of the Chinese nation we
must promote Nationalism. 39 *
According to Sun Yat-sen, nationalism is the instrument
by which the Chinese can prevent the destruction of their
country and the extinction of the Chinese nation.40 National
survival, in turn, is the necessary condition of the surviv-
al of clan and family. 43- And the survival of clan and fami-
ly is the necessary condition of the survival of man as an
individual
.
What the Chinese ought to desire is also what all men
naturally desire.
All of us are unwilling to see the extermination
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our^nation
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This is the natural thought
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^
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Of mankind. 42
8 (~ 13n ssl»-hsi ang,
Men' s struggle for survival prompted them to form a so-
ciety. But a society can exist only if there is some form
of political power to control and manage public affairs.
Democracy, which Sun Yat-sen defined as a system in which
"the people have the power to control and manage the affairs
of the people, "43 is conceived by him as an "instrument" of
human survival. This power has been organized and exercised
in four different forms in four different periods of
history. We are now in the fourth period in which "the peo-
ple are struggling against their monarchs and kings.... In
this period, the power of the people is steadily increasing.
We therefore call it the period of democracy. "44
sun Yat-sen maintains that democracy is inevitable "be-
cause with the rapid advance of civilization, people have
greatly increased their knowledge and developed a great con-
sciousness. "45 it is an inevitable development in the evo-
lution of political system.
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He insists that "no human power can thwart or hasten"
the development of democratic ideas and democracy. 47 Democ-
racy is inevitable.
A. Critique of Evolutionary Naturalism
. Similar to the
economic determinism of Karl Marx which he criticized, the
most apparent dilemma of an evolutionary naturalist like
Sun Yat-sen is: if all men naturally desire the survival
of their own nation (or race)
,
even if it means the destruc-
tion of other nations, and if human power cannot either pre-
vent or hasten the emergence of democracy in China as Sun
Yat-sen maintained, then what is the point of advocating
nationalism and democracy? The factual assertion in either
case is false. There have been various kinds of interna-
tionalists who desire, not the survival of their own nation,
but the survival of a specific class of people such as the
people of the same religious faith, political conviction, or
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economic class. Sun Yat-sen himself seems to admit this
fact indirectly when he criticises widespread cosmopolitan-
ism among the Chinese and deplores the "loss of nationalism
in China. "48 His exhortation that ^ ^
had democratic ideas, must adopt democracy if we wish last-
ing order and peace for China, security and happiness for
the people, and to follow the tide of the world,
i
mplieSj
not the inevitability, but the possibility of preventing or
hastening the establishment of a "democratic" system of
government in China.
Sun Yat-sen appears to be correct in his assertion that
all men, or at least most men most of the time, do desire to
survive, and that human survival requires different political
organizations in different circumstances. But does it fol-
low that, given the conditions that existed in China in his
days, the Chinese ought to adopt his Three Principles of the
People if they desire to survive? If his Three Principles
were necessary instruments of self-preservation for each and
every Chinese, then it would be irrational for any Chinese
not to adopt these principles. The term 'people' which he
used so often, however, is misleading. It tends to give the
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impression that he is talking about the survivai or extinc-
tion of all the Chinese. It cannot be denied, however,
that the political system he urged the Chinese to overthrow
did permit many Chinese to survive. And to bring about his
political system by revolutionary method necessarily requires
the sacrifice of some Chinese. Neither is a case of the
survival or extinction of all
.
In fact, the survival of an individual does not neces-
sarily depend on the survival of his own "nation" or clan or
family. Many Jews, Poles, and Indians whom Sun Yat-sen used
as examples in his argument survived and continue to survive
without their own nation-state or ethnic nationalism. Many
war orphans have also survived without the protection of
their original families or clans.
Furthermore, if most men most of the time do in fact
desire their own survival, it does not follow from this that
they also desire at the same time the survival of all other
men or their own nation. Those who desire their own sur-
vival could adopt any of the following normative positions:
(1) Any man whose survival is threatened has the moral right
(or obligation) to seek his own survival by whatever means,
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including seeking survival in a foreign country> (2) My
man whose survival is threatened has the moral right (or
obligation) to seek foreign intervention to end such a
threat. (3) Any man whose survival is threatened has the
moral right (or obligation) to support whatever form of
government which will protect his survival and national in-
dependence, including a system that permits slavery and a
system that puts a substantial proportion of its population
in concentration camps. (4) Any man whose survival is
threatened has the moral right (or obligation) to struggle
for the survival of the greatest number of his own people
within an independent, democratic nation-state even if it
requires the sacrifice of his life.
Sun Yat-sen rejects the first three normative posi-
tions and maintains that the only "scientific solution" to
the problem of people’s livelihood is the fourth position,
clearly
,
his commitment to the moral principles of nation-
alism and democracy leads him to reject the first three.
The survival of the nation and the preservation of democracy,
however, may be incompatible under a certain circumstance.
It is not inconceivable that under a certain circumstance
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some form of dictatorship is the only form of government
that can preserve the survival of the nation. If one is
committed to national survival, as Sun Yat-sen was, it will
be irrational for him to be committed to democracy at the
same time.
Sun Yat-sen, however, is not simply trying to derive
from his descriptive generalizations the normative principle
that the Chinese ought to establish a government (of any
form) which is able and willing to protect the bare physical
existence of the Chinese nation. He wants to derive from
his descriptive generalizations the normative principle that
the Chinese ought to establish a government which is "a gov-
ernment of the people, by the people, and for the people,
that is, a state belonging to the people, government con-
trolled by the people, and benefits enjoyed in common by
the people .” 50 This government ought to aim , not merely at
the physical survival of the people, but at "freeing all the
people from the suffering caused by the unequal distribution
of wealth and property, and enabling them to enjoy security
and happiness .” and at realizing a state in which "the peo-
ple not only share in common properties, but also all other
Ill
things and POwers."51 Neither the fact that most men^
of the time desire their own survival nor the fact that most
men most of the time desire the survival of their nation en-
tails that they ought to aim at their own or someone's or
everyone’s survival, let alone that they ought to aim at the
happy, utopian survival of all the Chinese people Sun Yat-
sen prescribed. Indeed, a government elected by democratic
process may decide by the majority principle to adopt capi-
talism rather than socialism. To insist on socialism in
such a situation implies the rejection of democratic prin-
ciples. This is an example of advocating simultaneously
ends which are not just competing but actually conflicting.
It is of course possible that the Chinese people, or a ma-
jority of them, may one day subscribe to all three normative
principles and carry out their commitments. But this even-
tuality does not prove that these normative principles are
therefore objectively true; it simply removes the irration-
ality of advocating incompatible goals.
Sun Yat- sen's normative doctrines are of great politi-
cal significance. The desire of self-preservation is bio-
logically instinctive. Nationalism in the sense of national
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self-preservation and national independence is favored more
or less universally by all statemen and public opinion at
the present stage of human history, due at least in part to
the systematic cultivation of this mentality by every na-
tion-state. Today almost all politicians advocate or pay
lip service to democracy and greater economic equality. In-
deed, a study sponsored by UNESCO reported in 1951 that
"probably for the first time in history, democracy is claim-
ed as the proper ideal description of all systems of politi-
cal and social organization advocated by influential propo-
nentSo 1 '-^
But none of these facts make the pursuit of these goals
objectively right or wrong. Human beings still have a moral
choice between life and death; and death is by no means al-
ways less desirable than life (e.g.
,
''give me freedom or
n1® death ) . Nations have a moral choice among the fol-
lowing alternatives: self-preservation within an independ-
ent state, merger with other nations, surrender of their in-
dependence to become satellite states, imperialistic expan-
sion, and world government. Democracy (regardless of how-
ever one defines it) and socialism are at best a genuine
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moral commitment of some people in both democratic and non
democratic states. In conclusion, it seems fair to point
out that Sun Yat-sen' s philosophical framework appears to
rest upon a relatively weak foundation of naturalism.
iiio Mao Tse-tung
PAfllectical Materialism and Political Ethics
. Like Sun
Yat-sen, Mao Tse-tung (b 0 1893), a founding member of the
Chinese Communist Party and its chairman since 1935, also
attempts to find a scientific basis for his basic moral
principles of politics. But unlike Sun Yat-sen who main-
tains that man' s struggle for survival is the motive force
of history
,
Mao Tse-tung holds that the development of op-
posing forces within things themselves and between things
is the motive force of the development of the universe in
general and of the development of human history in particu-
lar. He maintains.
According to materialistic dialectics, changes in
nature are due chiefly to the development of the
internal contradictions in nature. Changes in so-
ciety are due chiefly to the development of the
internal contradictions in society, that is, the
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' ? between productive forces and therelations of production, the contradiction be-tween classes and the contradiction between the
° and the new; it is the development of these
id^°ns ,that Pushes society forward (ch'ien-
£.hm ,
)
and gives the impetus for the super-
session of the old society by the new.... It [ma-enal dialectics] holds that external causes arethe condition of change and internal causes arethe basis of change, and that external causes be-
come operative through internal causes. 53
Mao Tse-tung agrees with Marx and Engels that "these
contradictions inevitably lead to different kinds of social
revolution in diiierent kinds of class society.
"
5^ Accord-
ing to Mao Tse-tung, "the contradiction between imperialism
and the Chinese nation and the contradiction between feu-
dalism and the great masses of the people are the basic con
tradictions in modern Chinese society," which in the 1930*
s
and 1940* s, was a "colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal"
society. 55 These contradictions and their intensification
must inevitably" result in the growth of revolutionary
movements. 5(3
But what kind of social revolution? According to Mao
Tse-tung, the nature of China's socio-economic system "de-
cides (chlleh-ting )" that the Chinese revolution must
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be divided into "two staple11 * ,ges
. the new bourgeois- democratic
revolution and the proletarian-socialist revolution.57 in
fact, the official translation renders this passage to read
Clearly, it follows, from the colonial, semi-
colonial and semi- feudal character of present-day Chinese society that the Chinese revolution
ffiust be divided into two stages. The first stepis to change the colonial, semi-colonial and
semi- feudal form of society into an independent,
democratic society. The second is to carry the
revolution forward and build a socialist society. 58
ihe nature of China's socio-economic system also "de-
termines (kuei-ting,^^)»» the "targets," "tasks" ( j^n-wu .
mission or public duty) and "motive forces" of the
Chinese revolution. 59 According to Mao Tse-tung, the "tar-
gets" of the Chinese revolution "are imperialism and feudal-
ism, and its main tasks are to strike at these two ene-
mies, to carry out a national revolution to overthrow for-
eign imperialist oppression and a democratic revolution to
overthrow feudal landlord oppression. The poor peasants
are the biggest motive force" of the Chinese revolution and
the proletariat (wu-ch'an chieh-chx literally prop-
ertyless class) is its "basic motive force. "61
Mao Tse-tung maintains that the Chinese revolution is a
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fttually serves the purpose of clearing all wider path for the development of socialism. 62
mao Tse-tung's descriptive generalizations of the in-
evitable historical development are not intended simply as
an explanation of the past and the present and a prediction
or the suture, they are meant to be "the guide to action."
Like Sun Yat-sen, Mao Tse-tung believes that basic moral
principles 01 politics can be derived from the laws of his-
tory. He maintains that Marxism, which he holds to be "the
most correct, scientific and revolutionary truth, born out
of and verified by objective reality, "63
teaches that in our approach to a problem, we
should start from objective facts, not from ab-
stract definitions, and that we should derive
(chap-ch , u <t^/%
,
literally find out) our guiding
principles
« policies and measures from an analysis
of these facts„64
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Thus, from the descriptive theory that contradictions
in a society inevitably lead to a certain kind of revolu-
tion and from the factual generalization that the Chinese
society is a "colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal" so-
ciety with the basic contradictions between imperialism and
the Chinese nation and between feudalism and the great mass-
es of the people, Mao Tse-tung derives the normative prin-
ciple that the Chinese revolution ought to be carried out
and that it ought to be carried out in two stages, namely,
the new bourgeois-democratic revolution and the proletarian-
socialist revolution.
Similarly, from the descriptive generalization that
there is no ism in the world that transcends utilitarian
considerations j in class society there can be only the util-
itarianism of this or that class,” Mao Tse-tung derives the
normative principle that "we [the writers and artists at
the Yenan Forum on Literature and Art] are [which means
ought to be] proletarian revolutionary utilitarians and take
[which means ought to take] as our point of departure the
unity of the present and future interests of the broadest
masses, who constitute over 90 per cent of the population,"
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and that " a thing is good only when it brings real benefit
to the masses of the people. J, 65
ACritique of the Metaethics of H^ torical „„
If one wants to demonstrate that a normative principle is
true because it can be derived from other statements, as
Mao Tse-tung does, one must establish that the premises in-
volved are true and that the inference is valid. One of the
premises from which Mao Tse-tung derives his normative prin-
ciples is the Marxist version of historical determinism.
Historical determinism holds that the past, present, and fu-
ture course of history is determined by laws which cannot be
altered by human volition. Social and ideological phenome-
na are reilections ' of objective material conditions. 66 It
follows that the development of the new bourgeois-democratic
revolution and the proletarian-socialist revolution in Chi-
na is beyond human control.
hao Tse-tung' s attempt to derive normative principles
of politics from historical determinism involves a dilemma
similar to Sun Yat-sen's attempt to derive his basic prin-
ciples of political ethics from evolutionary determinism:
he needs descriptive generalizations which are true to serve
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as his premises; but if they were true, then it would become
pointless to advocate the normative principles which he at-
tempted to deduce from the factual premises. Specifically,
if new democratic revolution and socialist revolution are by
historical necessity bound to happen, and if history has as-
signed the "task" (or "mission") of these revolutions to the
Communists, as Mao Tse-tung argues, then what is the point
of urgins every party member to strive to "complete China's
bourgeois-democratic revolution (the new democratic revolu-
tion) and to transform it into a socialist revolution when
all the necessary conditions are ripe,"67 and to *«win over «.
or to unite, according to varying circumstances, with all
classes and strata that can take part in the revolution"? 68
Indeed, the very act of urging the Communists to follow the
specified courses of action presupposes that they are not
bound by historical necessity to follow them. They can do
something else.
Another criticism can be made against any attempt to
derive normative principles of politics from historical de-
terminism. A logical conclusion consists merely of asser-
tions making explicit what is already contained in the prem-
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1SeS * T° derive the normative conclusion that a certain
class of people (e.g.
,
the proletariat) ought to carry out
the socialist revolution because it is historically inevi-
table, one needs a major premise that the proletariat ought
to bring about whatever is historically inevitable. But
this is an absurd principle, for it enjoins a certain peo-
ple to do precisely what they are bound by historical ne-
cessity to do. Moral principles can be applied to human
beings only to the extent to which they have a choice be-
tween at least two alternative courses of action.
Mao Tse-tung, however, has denied this interpretation
of historical determinism on several occasions. He maintains
that, in the relations between the productive forces and the
relations or production, between theory and practice, and
between the economic base and the superstructure, "in cer-
tain condition s . such aspects as the relations of produc-
tion, theory and the superstructure in turn manifest them-
selves as the principal and decisive factors (tso-yung
.
literally function or activity)." 0 -'' He asserts in unequivo-
cal terms that
When the superstructure (politics, culture, etc.)
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obs^ucts the development of the economic basepolitical and cultural changes become princioalanc cecisive. Are we going against materialismWhen we say this? No. The reason is that while
«:eC08““ that in the general development of“
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Er“ineS SOcial consciousness, weS — d we indeed must—recognize the reactiono_ mentai on material things, of social conscious-
ness on social being and of the superstructure onhe economic base. This does not go against ma-terialism
; on the contrary, it avoids mechanical
materialism and firmly upholds dialectical mate-
Some of the superstructure can even transform them-
selves into material forces. Mao Tse-tung asserts that
"once the correct ideas characteristics of the advanced
class are grasped by the masses, these ideas turn into a ma-
terial force which changes society and changes the world.
”
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Indeed, a combination of correct ideas, correct leadership,
and the availability of people is said to be capable of per-
forming every kind of miracle.” According to Mao Tse-tung,
Of all things in the world, people are the most
precious. Under the leadership of the Communist
Party, as long as there are people, every kind
of miracle can be performed. ... We believe that
revolution can change everything. „ . 72
It is perhaps unfair to take the expression ”every kind
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of miracle can be performed" literally and argue that it
must then be possible to perform a "miracle" to change the
future course of history. But the above assertions do con-
stitute a denial of historical determinism which he claims
to be a scientific truth verified by objective reality. They
reject the dichotomy of the determinants of history into two
mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive classes: the
material factor and the superstructure. Mao Tse-tung main-
tains in effect that both the material conditions and the
superstructure are the determinants of history. The mate-
rial conditions are "principal and decisive factors” in cer-
tain conditions; the superstructure is the ’’principal and
decisive” factor in some other situations. They together
constitute the sufficient conditions of any historical e-
vent. If this modified version of ’materialism” sounds more
plausible, it also admits that man’s deliberate choice and
action can influence the course of history. Men are there-
fore no longer bound by historical necessity, at least ”in
certain conditions," to carry out a certain revolution.
Mao Tse-tung also maintains at one point that Marxism-
Leninism is "a weapon" to fight both foreign and domestic
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enemies. 73 It ’’is the science which leads the revolutionary
cause of the proletariat to victory.”74 In other words> it
is the means to the end to which he and his followers have
committed themselves. Since Mao Tse-tung considers himself
a Marxist theorist, his assertion should also apply to his
own theory. If so, Mao Tse-tung is merely making the empir
leal assertion that the course of action he prescribed is
the means to
change a China that is politically oppressed and
economically exploited into a China that is polit-ically free and economically prosperous.... to
change the China which is being kept ignorant andbackward under the sway of the old culture into an
enlightened and progressive China under the sway
of a new culture. 75
It is also the means to ''create the conditions in which
classes, state power and political parties will die out very
naturally and mankind will enter the realm of Great Harmony
(£&•* t ung ching-i.^<:^f#r^p that is, "a society based on
public ownership, free from class exploitation and oppres-
sion. "70 These states of affairs are what Mao Tse-tung and
his followers desired to create; he does not establish that
they are objectively desirable or good.77
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CHAPTER IV
NONCOGNITIVISM AS THE FOUNDATION OF POLITICAL ETHICS
We have seen in the preceding two chapters how some
representative Chinese political thinkers belonging to the
two schools of value-cognitivism have attempted to demon-
strate that certain basic principles of political ethics
are intersubjectively true. We have found that neither the
intuition! sts nor the naturalists among them have success-
fully proven their case. We shall now turn to Chinese phi-
losophers who may be classified as value-noncognitivists.
It must be pointed out from the outset that there are few
noncognitivists among the well-known Chinese thinkers, and
or these few, only one (Han Fei Tzu) is a major political
thinker. Han Fei Tzu, however, did not work out a system-
atic metaethical theory. Like its counterpart in Western
philosophy
,
noncognitivism as a systematic metaethical theo-
ry has been worked out by philosophers who have had only a
secondary interest in political problems. But, as we shall
see, these Chinese noncognitivists have not developed a
kind of logical analysis similar to the one advanced by
David Hume or a form of syntactical analysis carried
for example, by R. M 0 Hare.
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i. Chuang Tzu )
In many studies on Chinese philosophy, Chuang Tzu(b 0 369
B.C.) and Lao Tzu are mentioned together as the founders of
Taoism, and their philosophies are classified as a kind of
’naturalism." This classification, again, is based, not on
their metaethical positions, but on their ethical and to a
lesser degree metaphysical views. At the metaethical level,
Lao Tzu is an intuitionist and Chuang Tzu is a value-noncog-
nitivist.
Chuang Tzu, however, is better known as one of the
greatest prose writers and “mystics” in Chinese history.
According to the last chapter (which may not have been writ-
ten by Chuang Tzu himself) of the book that bears his name,
Chuang Tzu is said to believe that "the world was sunk in a
muddy water and it was impossible to address it in sober
language.”! He therefore resorted to bombastic language,
outlandish terms, unbridled fancies, and various kinds of
allegory to illuminate his theory. 2 The book contains many
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dialogues of well-known Chinese thinkers. These dialogues,
however, must be taken, not as a record of actual events,
but as expository discourses invented by Chuang Tzu.
Moral Judgments Express Subjective Preferences
. Both
Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu advocate a natural way of life and a
laissez faire government. But unlike Lao Tzu who maintains
that the principle involved can be proved to be objectively
true, Chuang Tzu holds that moral judgments express subjec-
tive preferences which cannot be either true or false.
According to Chuang Tzu, the heart (hsin.V,' ), which
is the seat of all feelings, "presides (ssu, f)
,
also com-
mand or arbitrate) over question of right and wrong."3 But
unlike the proponents of the theory of innate knowledge such
as Mencius and Wang Yang-ming who maintain that moral judg-
ments made by the ' 'heart of right and wrong" are objectively
true, Chuang Tzu holds that judgments as to the rightness or
wrongness of an action and goodness or badness of an object
are expressions oi subjective "preference and dislike," They
therefore cannot have inter subjective validity in the way
descriptive statements are true or false. Like David Hume
who regards value judgments as expressions of subjective
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feeling which ‘'lies in yourself, not
Tzu maintains that "value (kuei
in the object,"4 Chuang
also worth, noble or
honor) lies within yourself and it is not diminished by ex-
ternal changes,"
^
the same position
With regard to moral judgments he states
indirectly in the following passage:
Right and wrong
t
(shlh
--fei^^ ) are what I mean
?
" ee
^
gs (eft i^g;^
,
sentiments). By a manwithout feelings I mean one who does not permit
?
is reference and dislike (hao-wu,*n£ ) to do
Jth™ dn a§e t0 his foUowsL the way of] nature and does not try to artifi-cially add anything to life.
6
ihe words 'shih-fei' have several meanings. In the
moral context, they mean rightness or wrongness of an ac-
tion, or to right an action in the sense of justifying it
or to wrong an action in the sense of condemning it.^ The
moral reelings are, of course, not restricted to preference
and dislike. For example, Chuang Tzu maintains that "dis-
like and desire, joy and anger, grief and happiness— these
six are the burdens of virtue."®
Right and Wrong Cannot be Determined by Any Arbiter
.
If
all men agreed as to what is right and wrong, and good and
evil, then there would be no need for moral argument. The
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problem is that, in Chuang T2U - S words> «there 1# ^^
Ucly accepted right in the world, and each man rights his
own right,"® He points out that some moral philosophers
affirm as right what other philosophers regard as wrong,
and condemn as wrong what others uphold as right. He says,
There are the rights and wrongs of the Confucian-ists and Moists, each school affirming as righthat the other regards as wrong and affirming aswrong what the other regards as right. 10
The question is: Is it possible for anyone to decide
who is objectively right or wrong? Chuang Tzu gives a nega-
tive answer. According to him, it is impossible "to form
judgments of right and wrong without first having an estab-
lished [moral point of} view."U To determine whose moral
judgment is right and whose moral judgment is wrong, the
third party must make a moral judgment as to the rightness
or wrongness of the action in question. On the basis of
this judgment, the third party affirms as right the moral
judgment which is in agreement with his own and condemns as
wrong the moral judgment which is in disagreement with his
own. Thus, like the moral judgments of the disputants, the
judgment as to the rightness or wrongness of the disputants*
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moral judgments is an expression of an arbiter's subjective
moral preference. The agreement of two or more subjective
moral preferences does not make their common moral prefer-
ence objectively right. In his words,
Suppose you and I have had a [moral] argument inwhich you won and I lost [e.g.
,
according to apanel or judges]
,
are you necessarily right andi necessarily wrong? Or if I won and you lost
am I necessarily right and you wrong? Or are weboth partly (huo,^'
,
also probably) right andpartly wrong? 'Or are we both wholly right or
wholly wrong? Since you and I cannot have a mu-
tual and common understanding [of what is right
and wrong]
,
others are certain to be in the dark.
Whom shall we ask to decide which of us is cor-
rect? Shall we ask someone who agrees with you
to aecide? But if he already agrees with you,
how can he decide which of us is correct? Shall
we ask someone who agrees with me? But if he al-
ready agrees with me, how can he decide which is
correct^ ohall we ask someone who disagrees withboth of us? But if he already disagrees with
both of us, how can he decide which is correct?
Shall we ask someone who agrees with both of us
to decide? But if he already agrees with both of
us, how can de decide which is correct? Appar-
ently, then, neither you nor I nor anyone else
knows which is correct. 12
Infinity of Moral Criteria
. Moral judgments are not
only expressions of subjective preference, the criteria
which may be adopted by various moral agents as the yard-
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stick of what is morally right,
etc 0
,
are in theory infinite in
that [what may be regarded as]
wrong, good, oad, obligatory,
number, Chuang Tzu asserts
right is an infinity; [what
may be regarded as] wrong is an infinity. "13 The same ac_
tion, therefore, may be regarded as right and wrong at the
same time by two moral agents who have adopted different
moral criteria. Even the same moral agent may regard the
same action as right at one time and wrong at another, when
he changes his moral point of view. Chuang Tzu dramatizes
this changing moral attitude in the following story:
,h u Po-yu has lived for sixty years and has
changed sixty times. There was not a single in-
stance
.
in which what he affirmed as right in thebeginning he did not in the end denounce as wrong.
So, there is no telling whether what he now calls
right is not what he called wrong during the past
fifty-nine years. 14
The question is: Can moral criteria be said to be ei-
ther true or false? According to Chuang Tzu, the adoption
or a speciiic moral criterion, like the adoption of a spe-
cific criterion of physical relations such as 'this' and
’that' or 'great' and 'small', is a logically arbitrary de-
cision. A moral criterion, therefore, cannot be said to be
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either true or false. This basic thesis is
following obscure language:
stated in the
lhere is nothing which is not 'this' ( shi -4
noth!
als
,°.
m®ans moraUy right) and thiTTis ’ing which is not 'that* (p{ ) Tl_ •becausecfthe right that th !
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Lhis has a standard of rieht andwrong, and that also has a standard of rightand wrong. ^So, is there really an objective"his and that ? Or is there really no obiec-tive 'this' and 'that'?15 7 ° j
Chuang Tzu maintains that there is no action which is
objectively right or wrong. There is no object or state of
af i:airs which is objectively good or evil. He had the Spir-
it of the North Sea say that "from the point of view of Tao
[that is, from Chuang Tzu' s point of view], things them-
selves have no value or worthlessness (kuei-chien
^^ , also
means nobility and baseness)." 16 The rightness or wrong-
ness of an action and the goodness or badness of an object
are always relative to the subjective moral criteria of moral
agents. Since moral criteria are theoretically infinite in
number
,
any action may be regarded as right by one of the
moral criteria and wrong by another. The same applies also
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to judgments as to the goodness or badness of an object or
a state of affairs. He points out,
from the point of view of preference (ch'U^also means taste or inclination or inti^T ifwe regard a thing as good because it is regarded
. ^
ch
^ someone] , then among the myriad thingsin the world there is nothing which is not good;"if we regard a thing as bad because it is regarded
in thp
h
w^lvL
S
^^
0ne
•
,
then 31110118 the “yriad thingsm e orld there is nothing which is not bad.17
Two examples from Chuang Tzu' s writings will illutrate
his theory. To those who place highest value in life, sur-
vival under whatever condition is more desirable than death.
But to those who value, say, freedom more than anything else,
it is perfectly rational for them to demand: "Give me free-
dom or give me death.” In a similar spirit, Chuang Tzu em-
ployed the words of an old skull in his dream to dramatize
that death could be preferable to a certain kind of life.
The skull, according to Chuang Tzu, was unwilling to regain
life and return to his parents, wife, children, and neigh-
bors because among the dead, there are no rulers above, no
subjects below, and no works of the four seasons. Free and
unrestrained, they take heaven and earth as spring and au-
tumn. Even the happiness of a ruler cannot exceed our hap-
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pinesso^
There are of course people who maintain that men ought
to take life as the basis and use knowledge as the guide to
calculate right and wrong. "19 there are mgny peQple ^
agreed with such a moral principle. But what does it prove?
Chuang Tzu maintains that the agreement among them does not
prove in any way that the moral principle is objectively
true. In his words, they are like the summer cicada and
the little dove who agreed with each other on what they had
in common. "20 Their biological conditions and the Umited
scope of their experience have prevented them from under-
standing ‘'why anyone [such as a fabulous bird of enormous
size called p.'eng (J^)] desires to travel ninety thousand
miles to the south?” 21 The fact that they cannot understand
why some people value something which appears to be totally
incomprehensible to them is, of course, not a valid reason
to claim that their own moral principle is objectively true*
Similarly, according to a certain moral criterion,
thief s, who are often condemned as the men without any moral
principle in a society in which property right is a basic
value, may be said to be men of high moral principle* In
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response to the question "Does the thief too have Tao [i.e.,
moral principle]?" Robber Chih says in part.
Making a wild guess on the location of hiddentreasures within a house is sageliness; being the
get
S
out
n
is
t
rivht
er ^ C°Urage; bein8 last tofLr . V f USness; knowing whether or notJ can be done is wisdom; and dividing up the
world had
3117 18 benev0lence
" No in the
ber if he
™CCeeded in becoming a great rob-- did not possess all these five [virtues]. 22
The point is: whether something is good or bad, or
whether an action is right or wrong, or whether a man is
virtuous or not is always relative to the subjective moral
criteria of moral agents. The adoption of a specific moral
criterion, however, is a matter of subjective preference.
Moral criteria and moral judgments, therefore, cannot be in-
tersubjectively true or false,,
ii« Han Fei Tzu
Han Fei Tzu (d. 233 B.C„), a prince of the state of
Han, is known as the synthesizer of the three tendencies
within the "legalist school" of thought who welded together
the elements of power (shlh .^ft ) emphasized by Shen Tao
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(Shen Tzu.^Ij., 350-275 B.C.?), statecraft (shM,#y) empha-
sized by Shen Pu-hai <***.' d. 33 7 B.C.), and law empha-
sized by Kuan Chung (sfo, d . 645 B
. c>) and shang^
(Kung-sun Yang or Lord Shang,^
,
d
.338 B
. c
.) t0 form ,
coherent legal theory. 23 He and Li Ssu d. 208 B.C.),
the first Prime Minister to the First Emperor of the first
Empire of China, were students of Hsttn Tzu, who, as mention-
ed in the preceding chapter, was the leader of "naturalistic
Confucianism" in ancient China. Han Fei Tzu's political
theory, which was probably shared by Li Ssu, was believed
by many scholars to have contributed to the unification of
China for the first time in 221 B.C. and the dictatorship of
the Ch'in Dynasty (221-206 B.C.). Han Fei Tzu, however,
fell a victim to an intrigue concocted by his jealous class-
mate Li Ssu and was forced to commit suicide in 233 B.C .24
Han Fei Tzu s philosophy has been characterized as Tao-
istic (i 0 e,, intuitionistic) by some scholars and positiv-
istic (i.e 0
,
noncognitivistic) by others. His writings do
contain statements which, if taken by themselves, appear to
justify both characterizations. But when we consider his
philosophy as a whole, Han Fei Tzu must be classified as a
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noncognitivist*
— '
Meanings of Tap in Han Fei Tz„ ' s Phi 1nB„phy Llke
many political philosophers we have considered in this stud-
y, Han Fei Tzu, too, refers frequently to 'tao,1 a term
which, as used by various Chinese philosophers, bears a
striking similarity to the term 'law of nature 1 in Western
political philosophy. Han Fei Tzu begins the chapter enti-
tled "The Tao of the Ruler" with the following words,
~,.is. the beginning of the myriad things and the
) of right and wrong . The en-lightened ruler therefore holds fast to the be-ginning in order to understand the origin of the
myriad things, and studies the criterion in order
to know the^ clue of^good [and evil, success] andfailure (shan-pai^c, literally good and failure
or evil) *25- - *
Taken by itself, it may be interpreted to mean a cog-
nitivist view that *tao' is the objective criterion of right
and wrong*
Like Mencius who speaks of "the Tao of the true king"
(wang-tao
, ), Han Fei Tzu, too, makes frequent refer-
ences to "the tao of the ruler" (chu-tao
. jj ) . For ex-
ample, he asserts that "the tao of the ruler of men is to
treasure tranquility and reservation*"^ He maintains at
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one point that
The sage who makes laws in the state must [be
ion^of ft
aCt C°ntrary t0 the Prevailing opin-
(So A f/
eJ8e “d f°Uow the iSO and virtue
*
also mean moral Principle). Hewho ^ows agrees with the principle of justicebut disagrees with the custom of the time; heho does not know disagrees with the principleof justice but agrees with the custom of thetime. ^throughout all-under-heaven those who
the Principle of justice wiu
Again, this passage may be taken to mean that there
are certain objective principles of justice which command
the ruler to act in a certain way and that these principles
can be known, presumably, through some kind of intuition.
Mencius would have subscribed to this view.
This cognitivistic interpretation, however, is neither
consistent with the main thesis of Han Fei Tzu's political
theory nor with the arguments in the passages from which the
above quotations are taken 0 In contrast to value-cognitiv-
ists who use tao to refer to a certain moral principle
which they claim to be objectively true, Han Fei Tzu's 'tao'
refers, in the broad sense of the term, to descriptive laws
of things and human affairs, or, in the narrower sense, to
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the most effective means to a given end. This interprets-
cion is supported by his explication of the meaning of 'tao'
in a chapter in which Han Fei Tzu advances his interpreta-
tions and commentaries on Lao Tzu's doctrines. He main-
tains that
is that by which all things become what theyare and is the basis of all principles. Princi-ples are the patterns (wen,
)
according to whichtings are completed, and tao is the whys and
fore
6
it
r
is sal
'^completion of all things. There-
in order^2 8 ’ — “ that Which Puts th“8s
'Tao* in this broad sense comprises all descriptive
laws of things and human affairs. In its narrower sense,
tao refers to various ways or roads (which are the literal
meaning of 'tao') to a certain state of affairs. Han Fei
Tzu is using 'tao* in this narrower sense when he asserts
that 1 those who follow tao and principles in their under-
taking never fail to succeed," and
those who discard tao and principles and take
arbitrary actions, though they have the honor
and power of the Son of Heaven [i.e., ruler] and
feudal lords on the one hand and possess the
wealth of I Tun, T'ao Chu and Pu Chu on the other,
will eventually lose their subjects and ruin their
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financial resources. The masse*
who di scard t|o and principles lightly and°takerbitrary actions easily do not know their pro-
ne ss^^29
aCt °n thGir OWn misfortune and happi-
The chapter entitled "The Tao of the Ruler" is not a
discourse on the 'way' to become a virtuous sage-ruler, but
a discourse on the principles and methods by which "an av-
erage ruler" or even "a mediocre ruler" can become a suc-
cessful ruler. In a language which will recall Machiavel-
li s The Prince
,
Han Fei Tzu argues that "the ruler will
enjoy success" if he, among other things, "treasures tran-
quility and reservation," "does not reveal his desires,"
does not reveal his intentions," and "discards his likes
and dislikes."30
By a successrul ruler Han Fei Tzu meant a ruler who
has accomplished three things 0 First, he is safe and free
from deception, manipulation and usurpation of his ministers
and subject So Second, he has brought about and maintained
peace and order in his state. Finally, he has built a
state which is strong enough to discourage and defend it-
self against foreign invasion. He maintains that all of
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these can be most effectively accomplished, not by a gov-
ernment of virtuous man advocated by Confucianists and Mo-
ists, but by a government of law which enacts, promulgates,
and codifies a system of laws and enforces it with rewards
which are dependable and generous enough to make people
think that it is profitable to have them, honors attractive
enough to make people feel proud to have them, punishments
inescapable and severe enough to make people afraid of them,
and condemnations (hui,£g ) repugnant enough to make people
feel ashamed to receive them.31 Han Fei Tzu argues that
such a system is the most dependable and effective system
because men "desire wealth, nobility, self-preservation, and
longevity or life," and dislike "poverty, lowliness, death,
and untimely ending of life."32 But due to the increase of
population, there is a scarcity of the supply of goods de-
sired by the people. 33 In such a situation, the "two han-
dles," namely reward and punishment, become "the regulators
of lire and death, and power is the capital to master ( sheng «
*
>
literally to win or overcome) the masses."^
Similarly, ' tao' means the road to success when he as-
serts "that the masses of the people want success but meet
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With failure is a result of their ignorance of tao and prin-
ciples and their unwillingness to ask the knowers and listen
to the able, "35 The same is true when he spegks Qf ^
to political order, "36 "the tao to disorder,"37 and "the
tao of self-preservation and long life. ”38
In all these cases, Han Fei Tzu maintains that a ruler
or a man ought to take a specific road or follow a specific
course of action, not because it is intrinsically good or
right to do so, but because it is the road or the course of
action that will lead to the end he desired. In other words,
Han Fei Tzu's 'tao' is not a principle of political ethics
which is objectively true but a principle of rational action
which is useful to a man who wants to attain certain pur-
poses, such as self-preservation, peace and order, or pre-
servation or political power. According to Han Fei Tzu,
questions of rationality must be settled, not by speculative
assertion, but by empirical evidence ( t s ' an-yen&&£
)
a 39
/
Han Fei Tzu 1 s Refutation of Cognitivism
. Han Fei Tzu
appears to maintain in a statement cited earlier that there
are certain principles of justice which can be known to be
objectively true through some sort of intuition. Han Fei Tzu,
142
however, explicitly excludes intuition as a method to gain
reliable knowledge. He maintains that " a prior, knowledge
consists of arbitrary conjectures (wW 1-tu
.^^ with_
out any evidence (jdian,^, trace or causal connection) ."40
According to Han Fei Tzu, "to affirm with certainty )
anything without corroborating evidence is foolish, and to
use anything which cannot be affirmed with certainty as a
proof is knavish Taking these two quotations
together, Han Fei Tzu may be interpreted to maintain the
position that the empirical method is the only source of
reliable knowledge. Since all "subtle and speculative the-
ories, including Confucianism and Moism, assert that basic
moral principles are true without corroborating evidence,
Han Pei Tzu declares, in rather harsh language, that they
are the philosophies of fools and knaves. "42
Han Fei Tzu*s view on the logic of moral judgments is
less explicit. He states at one point that
Men, on the whole, regard each other as right if
their [matters of] acceptance and rejection are
in common, and as wrong if their [matters of] ac-
ceptance and rejection are different. Now what
the ministers commend (yil « praise) is what
the ruler regards as right— this is called " ac-
ceptance in common." What the ministers condemn
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£Li> ^Isnie) is what the ruler regard*? aowrong this is called
"rejection in common." It
?matt
SVer
f?
en heard that Pe°Ple who have their
oppos:
r
:ac°h
]
oth^!43
anCe ^ r6jeCtion
—on
It is not clear whether it is meant to be a factual
statement or an analysis of the logic of moral judgments.
The statement is consistent with Han Fei Tzu* s "economic
interpretation of history" as well as his noncognitivism.
Taken as a descriptive generalization, it may be interpreted
to mean that moral judgments often reflect the economic in-
terests of moral agents and those who have common economic
interests tend to agree with one another in their moral
judgments. This is not an argument against value-cognitiv-
lsm. A value-cognitivi st may claim that some of the moral
principles adopted by a certain economic class or social
group are demonstrably true and others demonstrably false.
The passage may be taken to mean that moral terms such
as ’right' and ’wrong' express speakers' moral sentiments
of approval ("acceptance" and "commendation") and disapprov-
al ("rejection" and "condemnation")
,
respectively. To re-
gard those who have the similar moral sentiments of approval
and disapproval as right is then simply a specific instance
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Of expressing speakers'
"acceptance" of their moral judg-
ments. But this in effect is to accept or approve their
own moral sentiment.
Han Fei Tzu cails all moral principles in which 'right 1
and wrong and other moral terms occur "private good" (ssu-
or personal good) or "private justice" ( Ssu-i .
&& in contradistinction to "public" good or "public jus-
tice" (kung-I
,^ ^).44 " Private" moral principles are by
implication subjective. They therefore cannot be objective-
ly true. "Public" good and "public justice" are not meant
by Han Fei Tzu to be objectively good or objectively just
either o The term 'public' is employed by Han Fei Tzu to
designate any moral principle which is legal. The distinc-
tion between public and "private" justices, therefore, is
not between what is objectively just and what is subjective-
ly just (there is no principle which is objectively just)
but between what is and what is not sanctioned by positive
laws* What is legally right may, of course, be regarded as
morally wrong. Han Fei Tzu admits this fact when he says,
The ruler makes laws and regards them as the
standard of right. But nowadays most ministers
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Won!
thfr WiSd0m - They condenm the law aswrong and regard their wisdom as right. 45
Han Fei Tzu maintains that "a purpose of enacting laws
and decrees is to abolish private [moral principles]. Once
laws and decrees prevail, private moral principles (ssu-tao .
} WiU faU -"46 The ruler ought to establish a "gov-
ernment under law," not because he is morally obligated to
do so, but because it is the only dependable, effective and
therefore rational means to the ends he desires, namely,
peace, security and independence. Like Thomas Hobbes, Han
Fei Tzu maintains that citizens ought to comply with all
the laws which are "codified in books, kept in governmental
offices, and promulgated among the people,"47 regardless
ox. whether or not they approve of them, not because it is a
moral obligation of citizens but because it is the only ra-
tional course of action, in view of their desire for "wealth,
nobility, self-preservation, and longevity of life" and
their desire to avoid "poverty, lowliness, death, and un-
timely ending of life" cited earlier.
In conclusion, Han Fei Tzu may be described as a polit-
ical scientist who adopted the metaethics of noncognitivism
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and devoted most of his attention to empirical research on
how to establish and maintain peace and independence under
a monarchical form of government in an age he characterized
as "the age of great struggles."^ Han Fei Tzu, however,
did not develop his basic noncognitivist arguments into a
systematic metaethical theory.
iii. The Missing Links
It will be of interest to note in this connection that
Chinese noncognitivist s have not advanced any argument simi-
lar to David Hume's clasical rebuttal of value-cognitivism
that it is impossible to derive an "ought or an ought not"
conclusion from "is" or "is not" premises.4 '9 The absence of
Humean argument in Chinese philosophy may be regarded as a
consequence of linguistic practice. For more than two thou-
sand years, the educated Chinese have regarded omission of
the verb from a certain sentence as a correct, or even good,
literary style. Most philosophical works in Chinese are
full of sentences without verbs. If sentences are without
'is* and 'ought', it is almost impossible for a noncognitiv-
ist to discover from a syntactical analysis that a value-
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cognitivist has derived an
sion from "is” or "is not"
1
ought or an ought not"
premises. (This is not
conclu-
to imply
that there was no ought- sentence in the Chinese language.
The Chinese language was fully capable of such an expres-
sion had the philosophers wished to emphasize this distinc-
tion.
)
This linguistic practice seems to have hampered, too,
the development of a linguistic philosophy which clearly
differentiates the logical behavior of moral language from
that of descriptive language. A language which does not
provide a striking contrast between ought- sentences and is-
sentences in philosophical writings is not conducive to the
development of such a philosophy.
The way Chinese philosophers deal with words and their
meanings also tends to blur the distinction between descrip
tive language and moral language. What is designated as a
term or word in Western philosophy is commonly designated
as a ‘name* (ming ) by Chinese philosophers. A word in
Chinese therefore carries with it a connotation which is
akin to ’in name only'. The meaning attached to a word is
called ’ shih 1 (Wp ), which has been translated variously as
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substance',
'actuality',
sense of the word. 50
reality', or 'idea' in the Pla-
From this linguistic usage,
most of the Chinese philosophers who have anything to say
about words and their meanings have come to maintain that
words stand for certain realities or 'ideas' which are per-
fectly real. According to Confucianists, if a man has a
certain 'name' such as king, minister, father, son, etc.,
he has the moral obligation to live up to the 'idea' of
king
’
minister
» father, son, etc. According to this theory,
certain moral rights and moral obligations follow from cer-
tain 'names'. Thus, in reply to an inquiry about government
by Luke Ching of Ch'i, Confucius said literally, "King king,
minister minister, father father, son son," 51- which means:
Let the king be a [true] king, the minister a [true] minis-
ter, the father a [true] father, [and] the son a [true] son.'
The first word in each case is being used in a descriptive
sense, i.e», whoever is in fact a king, minister, father or
son. The second word in each case is being used in a nor-
mative sense, i.e 0
,
it rerers to the speaker's ideal king,
minister, nather, or son, or what a good king, minister, fa-
ther or son ought to be. It assumes that there is a single
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moral 'idea' of what a king, minister, father or son ought
to be and the moral 'idea 1 is objectively true because it
is the "correct meaning" of each term. According to this
Confucian doctrine, a moral philosopher who subscribed to
a non-Confucian moral principle is a man who does not un-
derstand the "correct meaning" of the terms 'king', 'min-
iote,.
,
father
,
son', etc., and he is so in spite of all
evidence to the contrary. Chinese noncognitivists, however,
have not developed a systematic linguistic philosophy to
refute this Confucian theory.
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CHAPTER v
CONCLUSIONS
This study began with the question: I s it possible to
demonstrate that certain basic principles of political eth-
ics are objectively true or false, independently of subjec-
tive moral commitments, and if so, by what method? Value-
cognitivists give a positive answer, but differ among them-
selves as to the contents of these principles and the methods
by ii/hich they are known to be true or false. Value-noncog-
nitivists give a negative answer to the question. A careful
examination of the arguments advanced by Chinese political
philosophers has inclined me to believe that the metaethics
of cognitivism in any of its varieties is untenable and that
value-noncognitivism is the correct metaethical theory.
By means of a careful analysis of the nature and func-
tion of ethical judgments, value-noncognitivism strips all
intrinsic ethical principles of the cloaks of truth and fal-
sity, of divine sanction, of the mystery of various alleged
insights, and of the title of scientific law, and returns
them to their subjective human origin. It affirms that all
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basic normative principles of politics are the subjective
moral commitments of their advocates.
It must be reiterated that value-cognitivists and val-
ue-noncognitivists differ only as to the cognitive status
of intrinsic ethical judgments. Value-noncognitivism does
not deny the possibility of value-commitments
,
and does not
deny that extrinsic value-judgments are true or false. Since
there is no logical connection between metaethical theories
and any normative political doctrine, value-noncognitivists
maintain that men are logically free to adopt any basic
principles of political ethics. Of the two Chinese value-
noncognitivists considered in this study, Chuang Tzu sub-
scribed to the basic principles of laissez faire government,
disapproving any governmental interference with the natural
transformation or things. Han Fei Tzu committed himself to
a centralized monarchical system aiming at the maintenance
of independence, peace and order by means of codified laws
enforced by generous rewards and severe punishments. (To
advocate a form of government or to subscribe to a way of
life is not the same as claiming that the principle involved
can be proved to be objectively true.) The history of West-
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ern political thought, too, shows that various combinations
have m iact been maintained. Among intuitionists, Plato
considered absolute government of the philosopher-king
to be objectively the best form of government, and John
Locke maintained that a democratic government which confined
itself to the protection of basic rights was the government
_n accordance with natural law. Among naturalists, John
Stuart Mill was not as extreme a proponent of laissez faire
as Herbert Spencer. Among noncognitivists, Thomas Hobbes
advocated an absolute form of government, Bertrand Russell
supported liberal democracy, and Jean-Paul Sartre (one of
the most influential existentialists whose metaethical view
might be considered noncognitivist) became a Marxist.
In this connection, it is only fair to admit that non-
cognitivism as a metaethical theory does not provide any
moral guidance. It cannot because it is not a normative
theory concerned with determining and recommending how the
law-makers and government officials ought to conduct their
public a.c fairs or how men ought to act in their capacity as
citizens. Conversely, neither a frontal assault nor a snip-
ing attack on a noncognitivist * s moral commitment or politi-
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cal preference constitutes a valid refutation of noncogni-
tivism.
Noncognitivists and cognitivists agree that extrinsic
value-judgments are not value-judgments but empirical state-
ments which assert that something is good because it is con-
ducive to a certain end. To settle a dispute between con-
flicting extrinsic value-judgments, the parties concerned
need relevant empirical evidence. It does not involve the
validity of the epistemological theory of value-cognitivism
or value
-noncognitivism.
honcognitivists maintain that judgments of rationality-
can, in principle, be true or false. The question of ra-
tionality is relevant to some basic moral commitments and
the courses of action adopted to attain basic moral commit-
ment So f'or example, to commit oneself (or a government) to
an end which cannot be accomplished by whatever means avail-
able or by whatever means that can be devised according to
the available information, or to two or more mutually incom-
patible ends are instances of irrationality. The question
of rationality also applies to the choice of a course of ac-
tion or policy in terms of value-commitments. A choice is
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rational if an actor or a government chooses a course of ac-
tion whose net expectable outcome is at least as valuable to
him (or the government) as any other available alternative.
In all these cases, the question of rationality must be set-
tled on the basis of empirical evidence and logical prin-
ciples. For this purpose, it is not necessary to presuppose
that basic ethical principles are objectively either true or
false
o
Finally
,
the arfirmation of value-noncognitivism does
not imply the denial of the possibility of empirical knowl-
edge* Empirical knowledge consists of those empirical hy-
potheses which are verified by observational evidence. They
are not abstract properties apprehended by various kinds of
intuition or arbitrary definitions stipulated by moral phi-
losophers.
Many opponents of value-noncognitivism have found it
unsatisfactory. They confessed that they were haunted by
the consequences, real or imaginary, of a metaethical theory
which affirms 11 self-determination 11 on the question of basic
principles of political ethics. They found it difficult to
accept that what appears to their subjective value-feeling
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to be the most abominable normative principle of politics
and what is subjectively certain to them to be the most
praiseworthy and true W are equally subjective value-
commitments, no more no less. Some of them even appeared
to favor some form of moral dictatorship over those who, in
their minds, were morally "underdeveloped” or "misguided."
Value-noncognitivists are aware of the agony of uncer-
tainty which some people seem to suffer in a world of moral
selr- determination, but they admit that they do not have any
magic formula for them. They hope that a better understand-
ing of the nature and function of basic principles of polit-
ical ethics will help them to face the challenge of the un-
certainty, diversity, and conflicts of men* s moral commit-
ments. Some value-noncognitivists like Chuang Tzu also hope
that an awareness of the subjective nature of moral commit-
ments will bring about an attitude of tolerance and humility
among men, thereby making it easier for them to live togeth-
er in peace. In the light of what men have done to one an-
other in the past, it is a hope that cannot be entertained
with a great degree of certainty. Apparently men will have
to work for it.
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. . chs. 3 and 37.
ibid
. . ch. 25, Italics added.
V Llakney actually drew this comparison. See his
—
be Way of Life: Lao Tzu (New York: Mentor Books 1955)
P.38. *
Hato, Republic
, various editions, 476, 507-508.
Lao Tzu
. op.cit
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Wang Yang-ming, op.cit
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7B:35; Wang Yang-ming, op.cit
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Wang Yang-ming, op.cit ., 2:20b-21a; 3:12b-l3a.
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Mo Tzu ) , I1SMT edition (see Bibliography for full title
and publication information), 26:122. See also 27:128-
129 for a similar statement. The second number is a
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Confucius), SPPY edition, 2:1; 12:11 and Mencius , op.
cit
. ,
3A:4; 3B:9.
Analects
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hsueh viian-lun fhe origin and development
of Chinese philosophy) (Taipei: Jen-shen Press, 1966)
chs. 1-2.
Complete Works , op.cit.
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pagination in the HMST edition. Hereafter cited asHsUnTzu,
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.
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139; Price, 416.
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